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THE WILL AS AN IMPLIED UNILATERAL  
ARBITRATION CONTRACT 
E. Gary Spitko* 
Abstract 
A consensus has begun to develop in the case law, the academic 
commentary, and the statutory reform movement that a testator’s 
provision in her will mandating arbitration of any challenge to the will 
should not be enforceable against a beneficiary who has not agreed to the 
arbitration provision, at least where the will contestant, by his contest, 
seeks to increase his inheritance outside the will. Grounding this 
consensus is the widespread understanding that a will is not a contract. 
This Article seeks to challenge both the understanding that a will is not a 
contract and the opposition to enforcement of testator-compelled 
arbitration provisions that arises from that understanding. 
This Article argues that a will is part of an implied unilateral contract 
between the testator and the state in which the state offers to honor the 
testator’s donative intent, and the testator accepts and provides 
consideration for the offer by creating and preserving wealth. 
Importantly, the greater contract respecting donative freedom of which 
the will is a part also includes a provision for the distribution of an 
individual’s intestate property in line with that individual’s imputed 
intent should the individual fail to execute an effective estate plan. 
Similar to a testator, a property owner who has failed to make an effective 
estate plan accepts this offer of intestate distribution through her industry 
and thrift. This Article’s theory borrows from the law respecting implied 
unilateral contracts arising from employee handbooks in concluding that 
it should be of no moment that the property owner is unfamiliar with the 
specifics of the state probate code. Rather, the critical factor should be 
that the state has, through its offer to respect donative intent, created an 
atmosphere that is “instinct with an obligation” and that encourages 
diligence and the prudent management of wealth. 
The conclusion that a will is a contract between the testator and the 
state grounds this Article’s additional argument that the Federal 
Arbitration Act (FAA) and state arbitration statutes require enforcement 
of a testator-compelled arbitration provision contained in a will even 
against a beneficiary who has not agreed to the arbitration provision. 
Settled arbitration law in conjunction with third-party beneficiary theory 
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or direct benefits estoppel theory supports binding the beneficiary to the 
will’s arbitration contract. A virtue of this Article’s theory—that the will 
and the intestacy statutes are both clauses in a greater donative freedom 
contract—is that the analysis escapes the limitations inherent in the 
dominant understanding that a will’s arbitration clause, if enforceable at 
all, can be enforced only against a beneficiary who seeks, by his will 
contest, to increase his inheritance under the will as opposed to 
circumstances in which the donee seeks to increase his intestate 
inheritance. According to the conventional wisdom, even if arbitration 
clauses are enforceable in some testamentary instruments, they govern 
only a narrow range of claims. This Article’s implied unilateral contract 
theory goes further and expands the universe of arbitrable contests. 
Specifically, this Article’s theory is the first that encompasses even a will 
contest that seeks to render the will a complete nullity. 
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INTRODUCTION 
The use of arbitration to resolve a probate dispute that parties would 
otherwise litigate in court has much to recommend it.1 Arbitration of a 
will dispute offers the potential for a faster and less expensive resolution 
than probate litigation in court.2 Will contest arbitration also typically has 
                                                                                                                     
 1. See, e.g., Pray v. Belt, 26 U.S. (1 Pet.) 670, 680 (1828) (commenting that an arbitration 
clause in a will was “given for the purpose of preserving peace, and preventing expensive and 
frivolous litigation”). 
 2. See Dominic J. Campisi, Alternatives to Litigation in Trust and Probate Proceedings, 
42 ARB. J. 30, 31–32 (1987); David Horton, The Federal Arbitration Act and Testamentary 
Instruments, 90 N.C. L. REV. 1027, 1030, 1035–36 (2012); Stanard T. Klinefelter & Sandra P. 
Gohn, Alternative Dispute Resolution: Its Value to Estate Planners, 22 EST. PLAN. 147, 151 
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the virtue of being private, keeping the private and personal facts at issue 
in the dispute out of public view.3 Moreover, arbitration of a probate 
dispute allows for the selection of a decision maker with expert 
knowledge relating to the matter in dispute.4 Such expertise typically 
might include, for example, specialized knowledge of the tax aspects of 
estate planning.5 It also might include a familiarity with the testator’s 
values and thus a fuller appreciation of how those values influenced the 
testator’s estate plan.6 The hope is that the decision of an arbitrator with 
                                                                                                                     
(1995); Bridget A. Logstrom, Bruce M. Stone & Robert W. Goldman, Resolving Disputes with 
Ease and Grace, 31 ACTEC J. 235, 235 (2005) (“Our collective gut tells us that the administration 
of a will or trust would run more efficiently and at less cost if we could resolve disputes arising 
in those proceedings through the use of an arbitral, rather than judicial, forum.”); Stephen Wills 
Murphy, Enforceable Arbitration Clauses in Wills and Trusts: A Critique, 26 OHIO ST. J. ON DISP. 
RESOL. 627, 630, 635 (2011). 
 3. Horton, supra note 2, at 1035–36; Bridget A. Logstrom, Arbitration in Estate and Trust 
Disputes: Friend or Foe?, 30 ACTEC J. 266, 267 (2005) (“Arbitration hearings are not public 
record and, therefore, may help to keep private details of family disputes private.”); Murphy, 
supra note 2, at 635–36; cf. Frances H. Foster, Privacy and the Elusive Quest for Uniformity in 
the Law of Trusts, 38 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 713, 725–26 (2006) (describing how the details of a trust that 
otherwise would have remained private might become public during trust litigation in the civil 
court system); Lela P. Love & Stewart E. Sterk, Leaving More Than Money: Mediation Clauses 
in Estate Planning Documents, 65 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 539, 553–54 (2008) (asserting in support 
of the use of mediation clauses in estate planning instruments: “A decedent who fears contest of 
her dispositions would undoubtedly prefer to avoid the spectacle of a trial in which her mental 
capacity, or her susceptibility to undue influence, is the central issue”); John R. Phillips, Scott K. 
Martinsen & Matthew L. Dameron, Analyzing the Potential for ADR in Estate Planning 
Instruments, 24 ALTERNATIVES TO HIGH COST LITIG. 1, 15 (2006) (“For some clients, the primary 
impetus for implementing the dispute resolution processes into trusts is confidentiality, often 
overriding concern about litigation costs.”). 
 4. Cf. S.I. Strong, Arbitration of Trust Disputes: Two Bodies of Law Collide, 45 VAND. J. 
TRANSNAT’L L. 1157, 1184 (2012) [hereinafter Strong, Arbitration of Trust Disputes] (suggesting 
that because “trust law can be quite specialized as a matter of both procedural and substantive 
law,” the settlor of a trust might especially value a decision maker with expertise in the subject 
matter). 
 5. See Robert L. Freedman et al., ADR in the Trusts and Estates Context, 21 ACTEC 
NOTES 170, 171 (1995) (“In many areas of the country the probate judges are becoming less and 
less specialized, while the trusts and estates practice, especially the tax aspects, has become 
increasingly specialized. Would it not be better in the future to try a trusts and estates case before 
an ACTEC Fellow than before a probate judge or a jury?”).  
 6. E. Gary Spitko, Gone but Not Conforming: Protecting the Abhorrent Testator from 
Majoritarian Cultural Norms Through Minority-Culture Arbitration, 49 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 
275, 297 (1999) [hereinafter Spitko, Protecting the Abhorrent Testator]; see also Richard Z. 
Kabaker, Joseph F. Maier & Frank Gofton Ware, The Use of Arbitration in Wills and Trusts, 17 
ACTEC NOTES 177, 183 (1991) (“A testator’s choice of executor, friend, or relative as umpire is 
logical given their personal knowledge of the testator’s desires.”); Blaine Covington Janin, 
Comment, The Validity of Arbitration Provisions in Trust Instruments, 55 CALIF. L. REV. 521, 
532 (1967) (“Because the settlor or the parties are free to select those whom they wish to decide 
future controversies, arbitrators may be chosen either on the basis of their knowledge in areas 
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a fuller appreciation regarding the testator’s estate plan would be less 
likely to be grounded in ignorance or prejudice.7 In sum, arbitration of a 
probate dispute seems to offer many of the virtues that have made 
arbitration an increasingly popular means for dispute resolution in other 
contexts, such as with respect to the resolution of commercial and 
employment disputes.8 
The weight of available evidence, however, strongly suggests that 
arbitration is not extensively utilized to resolve will contests.9 It is 
reasonable to suspect that unsettled questions relating to the 
enforceability of testator-compelled arbitration provisions contribute to 
this underutilization10: Given that typically a party’s principal motive for 
                                                                                                                     
most likely to become the subject of dispute or because of their familiarity with the settlor and 
beneficiaries.”). 
For an argument that arbitration theory and doctrine should more fully embrace arbitration’s 
potential to promote the autonomy of disputants to pursue shared values, see Michael A. Helfand, 
Arbitration’s Counter-Narrative: The Religious Arbitration Paradigm, 124 YALE L.J. 2994, 
2999–3000 (2015). 
 7. Spitko, Protecting the Abhorrent Testator, supra note 6, at 296–97 (arguing that 
arbitration allows a minority-culture testator to appoint a decision maker who is familiar with and 
respectful of the values that informed the drafting of the estate plan and, thus, to overcome biases 
inherent in traditional probate litigation). 
 8. To facilitate arbitration of disputes relating to wills and trusts, the American Arbitration 
Association has promulgated “Wills and Trusts Arbitration Rules and Mediation Procedures.” See 
AM. ARBITRATION ASS’N, WILLS AND TRUSTS ARBITRATION RULES AND MEDIATION PROCEDURES 
(2012), www.adr.org/aaa/ShowProperty?nodeId=/UCM/ADRSTG_024438; see also E. Gary 
Spitko, A Critique of the American Arbitration Association’s Efforts to Facilitate Arbitration of 
Internal Trust Disputes, in ARBITRATION OF INTERNAL TRUST DISPUTES: ISSUES IN NATIONAL AND 
INTERNATIONAL LAW (S.I. Strong ed.) (forthcoming Oxford Univ. Press 2016) [hereinafter Spitko, 
Arbitration of Internal Trust Disputes]. The introduction to those rules and procedures asserts that 
“[a]rbitration is an effective way to resolve these disputes [relating to wills and trusts] privately, 
promptly, and economically, utilizing as the arbitrator a lawyer or lawyers with substantial 
experience in the area of wills, trusts and estates.” AM. ARBITRATION ASS’N, supra, at 6. 
 9. See Freedman et al., supra note 5, at 170 (“Arbitration . . . is rarely used in the trusts 
and estates context.”); Robert D. W. Landon, II & John L. McDonnell, Jr., Using Alternative 
Dispute Resolution in Trust and Estate Planning and Contested Matters, course materials from 
the ACTEC Summer 2003 meeting, St. Paul, Minnesota (June 2003) (reporting on an “informal” 
survey of 122 ACTEC Fellows from California and Florida that found that 111 of the fellows 
reported never having used a mandatory requirement of arbitration in an estate planning 
document, while eight of the fellows reported having used a mandatory arbitration requirement 
between one and ten percent of the time). 
 10. See Logstrom, Stone & Goldman, supra note 2, at 237–38 (commenting that estate 
planners and their clients desire a more certain answer to the question of whether an arbitration 
provision in a will or trust would be enforceable); Strong, Arbitration of Trust Disputes, supra 
note 4, at 1163 (“[T]he minimal use of mandatory arbitration provisions in trusts may be due to 
concerns about the enforceability of such clauses.”). 
This Article is concerned with the enforcement of executory arbitration clauses in wills, 
which call for arbitration of disputes arising in the future. The enforcement of arbitration 
4
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utilizing arbitration is to save time and expense in resolving a dispute, a 
likelihood that the estate will have to invest time and expense in litigating 
the enforceability of a testator-compelled arbitration clause would tend to 
discourage the use of such a clause.11 
In general, the issue of whether a testator may force his intestate heirs 
and the takers under his will to arbitrate any challenge to his will remains 
unresolved in most jurisdictions.12 Very little modern case law addresses 
the enforceability of arbitration clauses in wills or in other estate planning 
instruments such as trusts.13 The sparse case law and academic 
commentary that exists on this point, however, suggests that a consensus 
is developing that a testator may not compel arbitration of contests to her 
will.14 
Part I of this Article demonstrates that the principal impediment to the 
acceptance of the validity of a testator-compelled arbitration clause in a 
will is the widely shared and long-held understanding that a will is not a 
                                                                                                                     
submission agreements, which call for arbitration of existing probate disputes, is somewhat less 
problematic and is not the focus of this Article.  
 11. Cf. Strong, Arbitration of Trust Disputes, supra note 4, at 1163 (asserting with respect 
to trust litigation that “[n]o lawyer wants his or her client to be the precedent-setting test case in 
a developing area of law, even if the outcome is ultimately in the client’s favor”). 
 12. Horton, supra note 2, at 1030; Erin Katzen, Arbitration Clauses in Wills and Trusts: 
Defining the Parameters for Mandatory Arbitration of Wills and Trusts, 24 QUINNIPIAC PROB. 
L.J. 118, 119 (2011); S.I. Strong, Empowering Settlors: How Proper Language Can Increase the 
Enforceability of a Mandatory Arbitration Provision in a Trust, 47 REAL PROP., TR. & EST. L.J. 
275, 287 (2012) [hereinafter Strong, Empowering Settlors] (noting that “many U.S. states have 
not yet addressed issues” concerning the enforceability of mandatory trust arbitration). 
 13. See McArthur v. McArthur, 224 Cal. App. 4th 651, 656 (Ct. App. 2014) (noting the lack 
of case law on the issue of whether a trust’s arbitration clause can bind a trust beneficiary); Rachal 
v. Reitz, 403 S.W.3d 840, 848 (Tex. 2013) (“There is a dearth of authority as to the validity of an 
arbitration provision in a trust . . . .”); Michael P. Bruyere & Meghan D. Marino, Mandatory 
Arbitration Provisions: A Powerful Tool to Prevent Contentious and Costly Trust Litigation, but 
Are They Enforceable?, 42 REAL PROP., PROB. & TR. J. 351, 354 (2007) (“[T]he extent to which 
courts will enforce such [trust mandatory arbitration] clauses under existing law is unclear.”); 
Logstrom, Stone & Goldman, supra note 2, at 237–38 (commenting that “[t]he question with a 
less obvious answer is whether arbitration can be mandated by a testator or settlor in a will or trust 
in a way that is enforceable,” but suggesting that “[t]he answer appears to be ‘yes’”); Phillips, 
Martinsen & Dameron, supra note 3, at 10 (“Just as there is little case law or scholarly 
commentary about arbitration clauses in estate planning documents, there is even less authority 
regarding the ability to bind the trust beneficiaries to an arbitration clause involving disputes 
relating to the trust.”). 
 14. See In re Calomiris, 894 A.2d 408, 409–10 (D.C. 2006) (holding that a will is not a 
written contract to arbitrate subject to enforcement under the District of Columbia’s version of 
the Uniform Arbitration Act); Murphy, supra note 2, at 641; cf. Schoneberger v. Oelze, 96 P.3d 
1078, 1084 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2004) (holding that a trust is not a written contract within the purview 
of the Arizona statute providing for enforcement of arbitration agreements), superseded by statute, 
ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 14-10205 (2015), as recognized in Jones v. Fink, No. 1 CA-SA 10-0262, 
2011 WL 601598, at *2 (Ariz. Ct. App. Feb. 22, 2011). 
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contract.15 This understanding has influenced the case law on testator-
compelled arbitration.16 It has also arguably cabined the thinking of 
scholars and the ambitions of reform efforts in this area.17 
It is indeed axiomatic that arbitration is a creature of contract.18 It is 
unquestionable as well, however, that the first principle of American 
donative transfer law is respect for the donor’s wishes19: The Restatement 
(Third) of Property states, “Property owners have the nearly unrestricted 
right to dispose of their property as they please.”20 Indeed, American law 
respects freedom of testation to a greater extent than does the law 
anywhere else in the world.21 
These bedrock principles—arbitration as a creature of contract and 
respect for donative freedom—on their face appear incompatible in a case 
in which a testator has directed in his will that any challenge to the will 
                                                                                                                     
 15. See Tzena Mayersak, Examining the Use of Arbitration and Dealing with Decedent’s 
Wishes in Wills, Trusts and Estates, 12 EUR. J.L. REF. 404, 404–05 (2010) (commenting that 
“[o]ne of the biggest obstacles regarding the use of arbitration in areas associated with estate 
planning is that wills and trusts are not considered contracts” and proposing as a partial solution 
the use of pre-drafting contracts between a testator or settlor and those who would be the 
beneficiaries); Murphy, supra note 2, at 639–43 (“[T]he few courts that have considered the 
matter have agreed that an arbitration provision in a trust or a will is not binding on its 
beneficiaries or trustees, because arbitration provisions are only binding when included in a 
written contract.”); cf. Strong, Arbitration of Trust Disputes, supra note 4, at 1209–12 (discussing 
the enforceability of mandatory arbitration clauses in trusts and explaining that “many 
jurisdictions require [that] an arbitration agreement . . . reflect certain contractual qualities”). 
For early assertions of the proposition that the will is not a contract, see In re Bates’ Estate, 
134 A. 513, 513 (Pa. 1926) (“[A] will is not a contract, but a mere expression of intention, to take 
effect after testator’s death, and subject, in the meantime, to revocation or such changes as the 
maker may deem expedient.”); Martz’s Ex’r v. Martz’s Heirs, 66 Va. (25 Gratt.) 361, 365 (1874) 
(“It cannot be said with any propriety that a will is a contract.”). 
 16. See infra notes 36–59 and accompanying text. 
 17. See infra notes 60–74 and accompanying text. 
 18. See, e.g., Rent-A-Center, W., Inc. v. Jackson, 561 U.S. 63, 67 (2010) (“The [Federal 
Arbitration Act (FAA)] reflects the fundamental principle that arbitration is a matter of 
contract.”); AT&T Techs., Inc. v. Commc’ns Workers of Am., 475 U.S. 643, 648 (1986).  
 19. See, e.g., RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROP.: WILLS & OTHER DONATIVE TRANSFERS 
§ 10.1 cmts. a, c (AM. LAW INST. 2003) (“The organizing principle of the American law of 
donative transfers is freedom of disposition.”); Lawrence M. Friedman, The Law of Succession in 
Social Perspective, in DEATH, TAXES AND FAMILY PROPERTY 9, 14 (Edward C. Halbach, Jr. ed., 
1977) (“It is often said that the principle of freedom of testation dominates the law of the United 
States.”); id. at 12 (asserting that testamentary freedom “is a leading principle in the United 
States”). 
 20. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROP.: WILLS & OTHER DONATIVE TRANSFERS § 10.1 cmts. a, 
c (AM. LAW INST. 2003). 
 21. See, e.g., RAY D. MADOFF, IMMORTALITY AND THE LAW: THE RISING POWER OF THE 
AMERICAN DEAD 6–7, 58–62, 154 (2010) (“American law grants more rights to the dead than any 
other country in the world.”); Friedman, supra note 19, at 19 (“American law is quite special too 
in the degree of freedom of testation that it grants.”). 
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must be arbitrated, yet the will contestant has withheld her consent to 
arbitrate her will contest. This Article seeks to reconcile these two 
principles in such circumstances. In sum, this Article argues that 
enforcement of testator-compelled arbitration is wholly consistent with 
the general legal and normative principles that ground contract law, 
arbitration law, and the law of donative transfers.  
Part II of this Article argues that the will should be considered a 
contract within the purview of the Federal Arbitration Act (FAA) and 
state arbitration statutes. Part II also argues that those who have failed to 
see a contract in a will have been looking in the wrong place. Courts and 
commentators are correct that a will is not a contract between the testator 
and the legatee, the devisee, or the heir. Nonetheless, a will is indeed a 
contract. A will sets out the terms of a contract between the testator and 
the state: a will is, in essence, part of an implied unilateral contract 
pursuant to which the state offers to give effect to the testator’s donative 
wishes at his death, and the testator accepts the offer and gives 
consideration for the contract by creating wealth, preserving and 
investing his property, and refraining from wasting his estate. 
Moreover, the will is but one clause of a greater contract entered into 
between the state and its citizen respecting donative freedom. State 
intestacy statutes are a second important part of this greater “donative 
freedom contract.” Intestacy statutes provide a default estate plan that 
governs the disposition of a decedent’s property to the extent that the 
decedent did not make an effective alternate plan of disposition during 
her life.22 The primary objective of the intestacy statutes is to approximate 
the donative intent of the typical intestate decedent.23 
Thus, pursuant to the intestacy clause of the greater donative freedom 
contract, the state promises that should the property owner fail to express 
effectively his donative intent with respect to the passing of his property 
at death, the state will nonetheless honor his imputed intent. The state will 
do so by passing the intestate decedent’s property at his death to his 
heirs24—those whom the state believes the typical intestate decedent most 
likely would have chosen to favor had he effectively expressed his 
                                                                                                                     
 22. See Robert H. Sitkoff, Trusts and Estates: Implementing Freedom of Disposition, 58 
ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 643, 645 (2014). Much of default law allows for contracting out. For example, 
spouses-to-be may opt out of the law governing equitable distribution of property upon divorce 
through the use of a premarital agreement. See PRINCIPLES OF THE LAW OF FAMILY DISSOLUTION: 
ANALYSIS AND RECOMMENDATIONS § 7.02 cmt. a (AM. LAW INST. 2002) (“[T]here is today 
widespread agreement, in principle, that such [premarital] agreements may be enforceable.”). In 
the inheritance law context, the state’s intestacy scheme provides a default law from which one 
may opt out by means of a will or a will substitute. See Sitkoff, supra, at 645.  
 23. Sitkoff, supra note 22, at 645. 
 24. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROP.: WILLS & OTHER DONATIVE TRANSFERS § 2.1(b) (AM. 
LAW INST. 1999).  
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donative intent. Like the testator, one who has failed to execute an 
effective estate plan accepts the state’s offer and gives consideration for 
the contract by creating wealth, preserving and investing her property, 
and refraining from wasting her estate.  
A virtue of this Article’s theory that the will and the intestacy statutes 
are both clauses in a greater donative freedom contract is that the analysis 
escapes the limitations inherent in the dominant understanding, discussed 
below, which restricts enforcement of testator-compelled arbitration 
provisions to those circumstances in which the donee seeks by her will 
contest to increase her inheritance under the will as opposed to 
circumstances in which the donee seeks by her will contest to increase 
her intestate inheritance. According to the conventional wisdom, even if 
arbitration clauses are enforceable in some testamentary instruments, 
they govern only a narrow range of claims.25 This Article’s implied 
unilateral contract theory goes further and expands the universe of 
arbitrable contests. Specifically, this Article’s theory is the first one that 
encompasses even a will contest that seeks to render the will a complete 
nullity.  
Part III of this Article considers generally the extent to which an 
arbitration clause in a will that is understood to be a contract should be 
enforceable against a donee who has not consented to arbitrate a dispute 
related to the will. Part III concludes that the donee’s refusal to consent 
to arbitration should be utterly irrelevant, as a legal and normative matter. 
Compelling a donee to arbitrate his will contest when he has not agreed 
to arbitrate is consistent with the law of donative transfers, a cardinal 
principle of which is that the rights of the donee are wholly derivative of 
and subordinate to the rights of the testator.26 Enforcing a testator-
compelled arbitration provision against the unwilling donee also is 
consistent with the law of arbitration. Settled arbitration doctrine provides 
that a court may compel a non-signatory to an arbitration provision to 
arbitrate her claim arising from the contract containing the arbitration 
clause if the relevant state contract law allows the container contract to 
be enforced against the non-signatory.27 As Part III further demonstrates, 
courts may utilize both third-party beneficiary theory and equitable 
estoppel theory to bind the donee to a will’s arbitration clause. 
Finally, Part IV of this Article addresses the argument that an 
arbitrator who derives his authority to decide a will dispute from the will 
should not have the power to adjudicate a challenge to the validity of that 
will. The argument, in short, is that if the will itself is invalid, then the 
grant of authority to the arbitrator is also necessarily invalid. Implicit 
acceptance of this argument appears in the limited nature of recent 
                                                                                                                     
 25. See infra Part I. 
 26. See infra notes 159–68 and accompanying text. 
 27. See infra notes 169–90 and accompanying text. 
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statutory reform efforts. For example, some reform efforts seek to 
validate testator-compelled arbitration with respect to suits to construe a 
will but stop short of authorizing an arbitrator to decide a contest to the 
validity of the will.28 Part IV also discusses the arbitration doctrine of 
separability and differentiates between the circumstances under which 
the doctrine should confer authority on an arbitrator to adjudicate a 
challenge to the validity of a will that gave rise to her authority to serve 
as the arbitrator in the first place, and the circumstances under which the 
doctrine should not confer such authority. 
I.  ARBITRABILITY AND THE CONSEQUENCES OF FAILING TO SEE 
THE WILL AS A CONTRACT 
To better appreciate the widespread understanding that a will is not a 
contract and the argument against the enforceability of a testator-
compelled arbitration clause deriving from this understanding, it is 
helpful to consider whom the testator seeks to bind pursuant to the 
arbitration clause. A testator’s direction that any challenge to his will 
must be arbitrated would directly affect only those who have standing to 
challenge his will. Thus, the rules for standing to challenge a will define 
the universe of those whom the testator might seek to bind with the 
arbitration clause. To have standing to challenge a will, one must have a 
direct pecuniary interest in the success of the will contest.29 Thus, a 
testator’s heir who would take more under the intestacy statutes than she 
would take under the will would have standing to challenge the will.30 
Also, a legatee or devisee under the will or under a previous will who 
would take more if the will contest is successful would have standing.31 
The understanding that neither the will nor the arbitration clause 
contained in the will is a contract relates to the fact that neither the 
testator’s heir nor his beneficiary under the will has consented to the 
terms of the will or exchanged a promise with the testator in consideration 
for the terms of the will.32 
                                                                                                                     
 28. See infra notes 74–93 and accompanying text. 
 29. THOMAS E. ATKINSON, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF WILLS AND OTHER PRINCIPLES OF 
SUCCESSION INCLUDING INTESTACY AND ADMINISTRATION OF DECEDENTS’ ESTATES § 99, at 519 
(2d ed. 1953). 
 30. Id. at 519–20.  
 31. See id. at 521. 
 32. See In re Naarden Trust, 990 P.2d 1085, 1086, 1089 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1999) (concluding 
that “a trust is not a contract” and “that the undertaking between the settlor and trustee is not 
properly characterized as contractual and does not stem from the premise of mutual assent to an 
exchange of promises”); Lah v. Rogers, 707 N.E.2d 1208, 1212, 1216 (Ohio Ct. App. 1998) 
(asserting that a trust is not a contract but rather reflects the settlor’s “unilateral decision” to place 
her assets into a trust); Martz’s Ex’r v. Martz’s Heirs, 66 Va. (25 Gratt.) 361, 365–66 (1874) 
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The argument against testator-compelled arbitration continues with 
the language of federal and state arbitration statutes aimed at abrogating 
the common law hostility to the enforcement of executory arbitration 
agreements.33 Section 2 of the FAA provides in relevant part: 
A written provision in any maritime transaction or a 
contract evidencing a transaction involving commerce to 
settle by arbitration a controversy thereafter arising out of 
such contract or transaction . . . shall be valid, irrevocable, 
and enforceable, save upon such grounds as exist at law or 
in equity for the revocation of any contract.34 
 
Thus, the FAA’s plain language suggests that one may not invoke the 
FAA to enforce an arbitration provision in a will unless the will is a 
contract. The Uniform Arbitration Act (UAA) and the Revised Uniform 
Arbitration Act (RUAA), from which most state arbitration law derives, 
have provisions substantially similar to Section 2 of the FAA, although 
the RUAA uses arguably broader language referencing “an agreement 
contained in a record” to arbitrate.35 
                                                                                                                     
(concluding that the will is not a contract and asserting that “[t]he very essence of a genuine will 
is[] that it is the voluntary, independent, individual act of the testator”). 
In developing his argument that a trust is a contract between a settlor and a trustee governing 
the management and distribution of trust assets, Professor John Langbein hints that a will might 
be treated as a contract between a testator and an executor. See John H. Langbein, The 
Contractarian Basis of the Law of Trusts, 105 YALE L.J. 625, 637 (1995) (“[E]xecutorship, like 
trusteeship, exhibits the twin features of contractarianism—consensual formation and consensual 
terms.”). 
 33. Many examples exist of judicial hostility toward arbitration in the context of a probate 
dispute. See, e.g., In re Meredith’s Estate, 266 N.W. 351, 357 (Mich. 1936) (“No stipulation such 
as here involved can oust the jurisdiction of the probate court, permit the probate judge to abdicate 
his jurisdiction and power, or delegate it to a third person not a judicial officer, and no stipulation 
can provide for the determination of the status of the codicil in any other manner than that 
provided by statute.”); Taylor v. McClave, 15 A.2d 213, 216 (N.J. Ch. 1940) (“This court cannot 
be deprived of its jurisdiction by any direction of the testator to the effect that his executor, or any 
other person, other than the court, shall construe or define the provisions of a will.”); In re Reilly’s 
Estate, 49 A. 939, 940–41 (Pa. 1901) (“A testator may not deny to his legatees the right of appeal 
to the regularly constituted courts.”); In re Will of Jacobovitz, 295 N.Y.S.2d 527, 531 (Sur. Ct. 
1968) (“The probate of an instrument purporting to be the last will and testament of a deceased 
and the distribution of an estate can not [sic] be the subject of arbitration under the Constitution 
and the law . . . of New York and any attempt to arbitrate such issue is against public policy.”). 
 34. 9 U.S.C. § 2 (2012). 
 35. Compare UNIF. ARBITRATION ACT § 1 (NAT’L CONFERENCE OF COMM’RS ON UNIF. 
STATE LAWS 1955) (“A written agreement to submit any existing controversy to arbitration or a 
provision in a written contract to submit to arbitration any controversy thereafter arising between 
the parties is valid, enforceable and irrevocable, save upon such grounds as exist at law or in 
equity for the revocation of any contract.”), with UNIF. ARBITRATION ACT § 6(a) (UNIF. LAW 
COMM’N 2000) (“An agreement contained in a record to submit to arbitration any existing or 
subsequent controversy arising between the parties to the agreement is valid, enforceable, and 
irrevocable except upon a ground that exists at law or in equity for the revocation of a contract.”). 
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The seminal case declining to enforce an arbitration clause in a will 
on the ground that a will is not a contract is In re Calomiris.36 In 
Calomiris, the District of Columbia Court of Appeals refused to hear an 
appeal of an order denying a motion to compel arbitration because the 
court held that there was no contract containing an arbitration provision.37 
Calomiris involved an arbitration provision contained in a will, which 
directed that parties use arbitration to resolve any material dispute 
between trustees of a trust that the will established.38 The court of appeals 
held that a will is not a contract within the purview of the District of 
Columbia’s version of the UAA and, therefore, the court had no 
jurisdiction to hear an appeal relating to the will’s arbitration provision.39 
In holding that a will is not a contract, the Calomiris court quoted the 
Arizona Court of Appeals’ reasoning in the influential case of 
Schoneberger v. Oelze,40 which had held that a trust is not a contract 
within the purview of Arizona’s arbitration act.41 The Schoneberger 
court, in a portion of its opinion that the Calomiris court found 
                                                                                                                     
 36. 894 A.2d 408 (D.C. 2006). 
 37. Id. at 410.  
 38. Id. at 408. 
 39. Id. at 410–11.   
 40. 96 P.3d 1078 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2004), superseded by statute, ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 14-
10205 (2015), as recognized in Jones v. Fink, No. 1 CA-SA 10-0262, 2011 WL 601598, at *2 
(Ariz. Ct. App. Feb. 22, 2011). 
 41. See In re Calomiris, 894 A.2d at 409–10 (discussing Schoneberger, 96 P.3d 1078). In 
Schoneberger, the trust settlors included an arbitration provision in each of three trust instruments 
establishing three irrevocable trusts. 96 P.3d at 1079–80. The arbitration provision provided in 
part that “disputes in connection with this Trust shall be settled by arbitration in accordance with 
the rules of the American Arbitration Association.” Id. at 1080. Some years later, two of the trusts’ 
beneficiaries sued the settlors as well as the trustees of the trusts alleging breach of trust and, in 
particular, that the defendants had mismanaged and dissipated trust assets. Id. The defendants 
moved to compel arbitration under Arizona’s arbitration statute, which was derived from the UAA 
and, similar to the FAA, provided that “[a] written agreement to submit any existing controversy 
to arbitration or a provision in a written contract to submit to arbitration any controversy thereafter 
arising between the parties is valid, enforceable and irrevocable, save upon such grounds as exist 
at law or in equity for the revocation of any contract.” Id. (emphasis omitted) (quoting ARIZ. REV. 
STAT. ANN. § 12-1501 (2015)). The defendants argued that although the beneficiaries had not 
signed the arbitration agreement, they were obligated to arbitrate as third-party beneficiaries of 
the contract. Id. The defendants argued in the alternative that the beneficiaries were estopped from 
objecting to arbitration since they sought benefits under the trusts (the contracts). Id. The court 
held that the beneficiaries need not arbitrate their claims against the settlor and the trustee 
“because such a trust is not a ‘written contract’ requiring arbitration.” Id. at 1079. “Under either 
[third-party beneficiary or equitable estoppel] theory, however, defendants face a fundamental 
problem that defeats their demand for arbitration: section 12-1501 required defendants to prove 
the existence of ‘a provision in a written contract to submit to arbitration.’ They failed to make 
this showing because, as a matter of law, the trusts at issue here were not contracts.” Id. at 1082. 
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“instructive,”42 emphasized that “[a]rbitration rests on an exchange of 
promises,” but a trust does not.43 “The ‘undertaking’ between trustor and 
trustee,” the Schoneberger court concluded, “‘does not stem from the 
premise of mutual assent to an exchange of promises’ and ‘is not properly 
characterized as contractual.’”44 Thus, the critical issue for the Calomiris 
court in holding that a will is not a contract appears to have been that a 
will does not rest upon an exchange of promises.45 
More recently, in the 2013 case of Rachal v. Reitz,46 the Supreme 
Court of Texas held that despite the absence of an exchange of promises, 
a settlor-compelled arbitration provision in a trust is enforceable under 
the Texas Arbitration Act (TAA) to bind a trust beneficiary who seeks 
benefits under the trust.47 In Rachal, the trust instrument provided that 
“as to any dispute of any kind involving [the] Trust or any of the parties 
or persons concerned herewith (e.g., beneficiaries, Trustees), 
arbitration . . . shall be the sole and exclusive remedy.”48 Nonetheless, a 
beneficiary of the trust later sued the trustee, alleging that the trustee had 
misappropriated trust assets and had failed to provide a proper accounting 
to the trust beneficiaries.49 The trustee then moved to compel 
arbitration.50  
 
The Rachal court decided the case under the TAA, which, similar to 
the RUAA, provided that a “written agreement to arbitrate is valid and 
enforceable.”51 The court did not hold that the trust or the arbitration 
provision in the trust could be treated as a contract. Rather, the court held 
that no formal arbitration contract was necessary, as the TAA required 
only a written agreement to arbitrate.52 The court interpreted the term 
agreement to mean a manifestation of mutual assent.53 Finally, the court 
found that, in the instant case, the beneficiary manifested his assent to the 
                                                                                                                     
 42. In re Calomiris, 894 A.2d at 409.  
 43. Schoneberger, 96 P.3d at 1083. 
 44. Id. (quoting In re Naarden Trust, 990 P.2d 1085, 1089 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1999)). 
 45. See In re Calomiris, 894 A.2d at 409–10. 
 46. 403 S.W.3d 840 (Tex. 2013). 
 47. Id. at 844–47. 
 48. Id. at 842. 
 49. Id. 
 50. Id. 
 51. TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 171.001(a) (West 2015). 
 52. See Rachal, 403 S.W.3d at 844–45; see also Rachel M. Hirshberg, Note, You Can’t 
Have Your Trust and Defeat It Too: Why Mandatory Arbitration Provisions in Trusts Are 
Enforceable, and Why State Courts Are Getting It Wrong, 2013 J. DISP. RESOL. 213, 227–28 
(noting that the TAA requires only an agreement to arbitrate and arguing for a broad 
interpretation of the TAA so that an arbitration clause in a trust might be enforceable against a 
beneficiary). 
 53. Rachal, 403 S.W.3d at 845. 
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arbitration provision in the trust by seeking to enforce his rights under the 
trust.54 In so concluding, the court relied upon the doctrine of direct 
benefits estoppel. Essentially, this doctrine provides that a non-signatory 
to an agreement may not seek to benefit under the agreement while 
simultaneously seeking to avoid the agreement’s burdens.55 Thus, the 
Rachal court held that “[i]n accepting the benefits of the trust and suing 
to enforce its terms against the trustee so as to recover damages, [the 
beneficiary]’s conduct indicated acceptance of the terms and validity of 
the trust.”56 
The reasoning of the Rachal court seemingly applies full force in a 
case in which an arbitration clause is in a will rather than a trust. 
Accordingly, a court may find that a legatee or devisee who seeks to 
benefit under the will has assented to the will’s arbitration clause. The 
doctrine of direct benefits estoppel would preclude the beneficiary from 
seeking to benefit under the will while simultaneously seeking to avoid 
the will’s arbitration provision. 
The principal limitations of the Rachal court’s holdings would also 
seem to apply full force in the case of a will’s arbitration provision. First, 
the Rachal court’s analysis is a nonstarter in any case governed by an 
arbitration statute that makes enforceable only arbitration “contracts” but 
not arbitration “agreements.” Second, under the Rachal court’s analysis, 
the doctrine of direct benefits estoppel could not be used to find an heir’s 
assent to the will’s arbitration provision when the heir does not seek to 
benefit under the will.57 As the Rachal court reasoned with respect to 
trusts, “One who does not accept benefits under a trust and contests its 
validity could not be compelled to arbitrate the trust dispute under the 
doctrine of direct benefits estoppel.”58 Thus, an heir who seeks to 
invalidate the will could not be bound by the will’s arbitration clause.59 
Just as there is a dearth of case law addressing the enforceability of 
                                                                                                                     
 54. See id. at 845–47. 
 55. Id. at 846. 
 56. Id. at 847. 
 57. See McArthur v. McArthur, 224 Cal. Rptr. 3d 651, 653–54, 658 (Cal. Ct. App. 2014) 
(holding that a trust beneficiary who sought to set aside a trust amendment that purported to alter 
a trust’s distributive provisions and to add an arbitration clause to the trust was not bound by the 
arbitration provision given that she had not accepted benefits under the trust amendment); Horton, 
supra note 2, at 1060 (“[I]f an omitted heir contends that an entire trust was obtained by undue 
influence, there is simply no basis to deem him to have acquiesced to any part of the instrument.”); 
Murphy, supra note 2, at 649 (“If the arbitration clause was enforced based on Benefit Theory, 
but a beneficiary chose to contest the will or trust, then she could still bring that action in court, 
outside of the arbitration clause.”). 
 58. Rachal, 403 S.W.3d at 850. 
 59. See id. at 847 (commenting that a trust beneficiary’s challenge to the validity of the trust 
“is incompatible with the idea that she has consented to the instrument”).  
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testator-compelled arbitration, very little scholarship addresses the 
issue.60 Professor David Horton has published arguably the most 
sophisticated academic treatment of the topic.61 His focus is on whether 
the FAA governs an arbitration clause found in a will or trust.62 
Professor Horton acknowledges at the outset that the text of the FAA, 
on its face, limits the statute’s reach to arbitration clauses embedded in 
“contracts.”63 Moreover, he concludes from the FAA’s legislative 
history64 that “Congress almost certainly meant to limit the FAA to 
arbitration clauses in ‘contracts.’”65 
Nonetheless, despite his understanding that a will is not a contract, 
Professor Horton concludes that “the FAA likely governs arbitration 
clauses in wills and trusts.”66 Professor Horton reasons that the U.S. 
Supreme Court, “[t]o further its pro-arbitration agenda,” has not applied 
the law to limit the FAA’s coverage to only arbitration clauses in 
contracts.67 Rather, the Court has interpreted the FAA so that it applies in 
situations in which the parties have not contracted to arbitrate but have 
“agreed” to arbitrate68: “As a matter of federal common law,” Professor 
Horton writes, “the FAA hinges on whether the parties have agreed to 
arbitrate, not whether there is a ‘contract’ in which the arbitration clause 
appears. In turn, wills and trusts are capable of giving rise to agreements 
to arbitrate . . . .”69 
In considering whether the beneficiary has “agreed” to arbitrate, 
Professor Horton expressly relies on the same direct benefits  estoppel 
doctrine that subsequently became the center of the Rachal court’s 
analysis under the TAA.70 Professor Horton argues that, quite simply, 
“parties to an estate plan can agree to arbitrate by accepting benefits under 
the terms of an instrument that contains an arbitration clause.”71  
Thus, Professor Horton’s analysis shares a critical limitation with the 
Rachal court’s analysis: The arbitration statute will not compel an heir to 
                                                                                                                     
 60. See Horton, supra note 2, at 1031 n.23 (noting that only one law review article “even 
mentions the FAA and wills and trusts in passing”). 
 61. See generally id. (providing an in-depth analysis of the application of the FAA to wills 
and trusts). 
 62. Id. at 1031–32. 
 63. Id. at 1049. 
 64. See id. at 1051–54 (reviewing the legislative history of the FAA). 
 65. Id. at 1032. 
 66. Id. 
 67. Id. 
 68. See id. at 1032, 1054–58 (reviewing federal cases in which courts have upheld 
arbitration clauses despite arguably flawed underlying contracts). 
 69. Id. at 1049. 
 70. See id. at 1061–65 (explaining how the equitable estoppel doctrine applies to 
beneficiaries of testamentary instruments).   
 71. Id. at 1062. 
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arbitrate her challenge that seeks to increase her intestate inheritance—
probate property passing to the contestant outside of the will.72 Indeed, 
Professor Horton concedes that this limitation “may diminish the FAA’s 
usefulness in probate” given that “[t]estators and settlors place arbitration 
clauses in wills and trusts largely to minimize the expense and delay 
caused by individuals who are disappointed with their gifts.”73 Professor 
Horton’s analysis also shares a second critical limitation with the Rachal 
court’s analysis. His approach is a nonstarter if the federal or state court 
concludes that the FAA reaches only those arbitration clauses contained 
in a contract. 
Uncertainty surrounding the question of whether an arbitration clause 
contained in a testamentary instrument is enforceable has led numerous 
commentators to call for statutory reform to address the issue.74 In 2006, 
for example, after more than two years of studying the issue, the 
American College of Trust and Estate Counsel (ACTEC) issued a task 
force report addressing arbitration of wills and trusts disputes and 
proposing model legislation that would, if enacted, authorize limited 
enforcement of arbitration clauses in wills and trusts.75 The ACTEC task 
force expressed its judgment that private arbitration of disputes relating 
to wills and trusts utilizing an expert decision maker would lead to the 
more efficient and cost-effective administration of wills and trusts.76 The 
task force acknowledged, however, that uncertainty existed as to 
“whether arbitration can be mandated by a person in his or her will or 
trust in a way that is enforceable”77 and that the widespread 
understanding that neither a will nor a trust is a contract had contributed 
to this uncertainty.78 
                                                                                                                     
 72. See Rachal v. Reitz, 403 S.W.3d 840, 846–47 (Tex. 2013); Horton, supra note 2, at 
1075 (explaining that a litigant who is not seeking to gain the advantages of the testamentary 
instrument, or who challenges the existence of the instrument itself, cannot be bound by 
arbitration); see also id. at 1064 (arguing that the beneficiaries’ challenge to the validity of a will 
or trust “is incompatible with the idea that they have consented to the instrument”). 
 73. Horton, supra note 2, at 1075. 
 74. See, e.g., Bruyere & Marino, supra note 13, at 355, 361, 364 (arguing that, given the 
unsettled state of the law, “the safest route to enforceable mandatory arbitration provisions [in 
trusts] is through the state legislatures”); Murphy, supra note 2, at 661 (rejecting theories that 
some have offered to validate arbitration provisions in wills and trusts, and arguing that “a better 
means to properly enforce these clauses would be to act legislatively, through a statutory 
amendment”).  
 75. See AM. COLL. OF TR. & ESTATE COUNSEL, ARBITRATION TASK FORCE REPORT 27–33 (2006), 
http://msba.mnbar.org/docs/default-source/probate-and-trust-section/actec-arbitration-task-force-
report.pdf. The ACTEC task force first met in the summer of 2004 and issued its report in 
September 2006. Id. at 3. 
 76. Id. at 5. 
 77. Id. at 9. 
 78. See id. at 10–11. 
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The task force recommended statutory reform to achieve the desired 
certainty respecting the issue.79 Specifically, the task force proposed a 
“Model Enforceability Act,” which states that “[a] provision in a will or 
trust requiring the arbitration of disputes between or among the 
beneficiaries, a fiduciary under the will or trust, or any combination of 
them, is enforceable.”80 The model act goes on to clarify this language by 
stating that if a person challenges the validity of the arbitration provision 
“either expressly or as part of a challenge to the validity of all or a portion 
of the will or trust containing the arbitration clause, [then] the court shall 
determine the validity of the arbitration provision and any additional 
challenge to the validity of the will or trust.”81 
Thus, under ACTEC’s Model Enforceability Act, one who challenges 
the validity of any portion of a will or trust would not be bound by the 
arbitration provision found in the will or trust. The task force members 
considered but rejected the idea of providing for a separate judicial 
proceeding addressing only the validity of the arbitration clause to be 
followed, if the court found the arbitration clause to be valid, by 
arbitration addressing the merits of the will or trust contest.82 The drafters 
feared that a two-step process “would involve two trials involving 
virtually the same proof” and that the duplication would conflict with 
their “goal of developing a simpler method of trial resolution.”83 
Therefore, for the drafters, it became necessary to destroy arbitration to 
save it.84 
Since ACTEC released its task force report and recommendations in 
2006, a few states have enacted legislation providing for the limited 
enforcement of arbitration provisions in donative instruments. In 2007, 
Florida enacted a statute based on the ACTEC model law.85 The Florida 
                                                                                                                     
 79. Id. at 11 (“We could bring certainty to the issue by a statute allowing a testator or settlor 
to require by will or trust that disputes involving the estate or trust administration be decided by 
an arbitrator, rather than a court.”).  
 80. Id. at 27. 
 81. Id. at 28. The ACTEC Arbitration Task Force Report proposes a second model act, the 
“Model Simplified Trial Resolution Act,” which contains enforceability provisions substantially 
identical to the ones contained in the Model Enforceability Act but also includes a default process 
for resolving disputes. See id. at 28–33. 
 82. Id. at 28 n.17. 
 83. Id. 
 84. In contrast, the FAA is unequivocally hostile to such a sentiment with respect to an 
arbitration contract to which it applies. See Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc. v. Byrd, 470 U.S. 213, 
217 (1985) (holding that the FAA “requires district courts to compel arbitration of pendent 
arbitrable claims when one of the parties files a motion to compel, even where the result would 
be the possibly inefficient maintenance of separate proceedings in different forums”).  
 85. See FLA. STAT. § 731.401 (2015); see also Murphy, supra note 2, at 665–66 (citing an 
interview with Robert W. Goldman, Chair of the ACTEC Arbitration Task Force, in support of 
the assertion that the Florida statute was based on ACTEC’s model law).  
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statute makes enforceable “[a] provision in a will or trust requiring the 
arbitration of disputes, other than disputes of the validity of all or a part 
of a will or trust.”86 Thus, like the Model Enforceability Act, the Florida 
statute does not apply to a will contest brought by a donee who seeks to 
increase her inheritance outside of the will by challenging the will in 
whole or in part, or even to a will contest brought by a donee who seeks 
to increase her inheritance under one part of the will by challenging 
another part of the will. 
In 2008, in response to the 2004 Arizona Court of Appeals decision in 
Schoneberger, Arizona enacted a statute providing that “[a] trust 
instrument may provide mandatory, exclusive and reasonable procedures 
to resolve issues between the trustee and interested persons or among 
interested persons with regard to the administration or distribution of the 
trust.”87 On its face, this statute does not apply to any will contest. 
Moreover, a natural reading of the statute’s language suggests that the 
statute also does not apply to any challenge to the validity of all or part 
of a trust.88 
Finally, in 2014, both Missouri and New Hampshire enacted 
legislation authorizing the enforcement of certain arbitration provisions 
imposed by the settlor of a trust on persons with an interest in the trust.89 
Neither statute applies to arbitration of a will contest. Missouri’s statute 
states that “a provision in a trust instrument requiring the mediation or 
arbitration of disputes between or among the beneficiaries, a fiduciary, a 
person granted nonfiduciary powers under the trust instrument, or any 
combination of such persons is enforceable.”90 The statute further states, 
however, that any provision “requiring the mediation or arbitration of 
disputes relating to the validity of a trust is not enforceable unless all 
interested persons with regard to the dispute consent to the mediation or 
arbitration of the dispute.”91 New Hampshire’s statute is similar. The 
New Hampshire statute provides that “[i]f the terms of the trust require 
the interested persons to resolve a trust dispute exclusively by reasonable 
                                                                                                                     
 86. FLA. STAT. § 731.401(1). 
 87. See ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 14-10205 (2015). 
 88. See Murphy, supra note 2, at 666 (concluding that “the Arizona provision does not 
allow the arbitration of the validity of the trust instrument itself; that determination must be made 
by the court, since the Arizona law only provides for the resolution of disputes ‘with regard to the 
administration or distribution of the trust’” (quoting ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 14-10205)). But see 
Horton, supra note 2, at 1076–77 (asserting that the Arizona statute applies to challenges to the 
validity of an estate plan). 
 89. See MO. ANN. STAT. § 456.2-205 (West 2015); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 564-B:1-111A 
(2015). 
 90. MO. ANN. STAT. § 456.2-205(1). 
 91. Id. § 456.2-205(2). 
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nonjudicial procedures, then those interested persons shall resolve that 
trust dispute in accordance with the terms of the trust.”92 The statute 
defines a “trust dispute,” however, to exclude “a determination of the 
validity of the trust.”93 
Thus, with respect to arbitration clauses in donative instruments 
generally and testamentary arbitration clauses specifically, the limited 
case law, academic commentary, and prominent proposed and enacted 
statutory reforms all share a common limitation. None support the 
enforcement of a donor-mandated arbitration provision in the case of a 
challenge to the validity of the donative instrument. 
With respect to testator-compelled arbitration, the root of this 
limitation is the understanding that a will is not a contract. This mindset 
informs the conclusion that neither the FAA nor state arbitration statutes 
support enforcement of a testator-compelled arbitration clause respecting 
a challenge to the validity of a will. This mindset also arguably has 
cabined the ambitions of law reform efforts. Given the premise that the 
donee has not contracted to arbitrate her claims against the will, the 
conclusion may follow that it would be unfair to force the donee to 
arbitrate such claims. 
This Article turns next to an argument that challenges these dominant 
understandings. This Article seeks to persuade judges that the courts have 
sufficient authority under existing federal and state arbitration statutes to 
enforce a testator-compelled arbitration provision even with respect to a 
will contestant who does not seek to take under the will or who seeks 
through his contest to redirect property to the intestate estate that 
otherwise would pass under the will. At the same time, given the virtue 
of certainty with respect to the enforceability of any arbitration provision, 
this Article seeks also to convince legislators that, as a normative matter, 
it is appropriate to enact legislation that will make more certain the right 
of a testator to compel arbitration.  
II.  THE WILL AS AN IMPLIED UNILATERAL ARBITRATION CONTRACT 
This Part strives to demonstrate that a will fits within existing contract 
law as an implied-in-fact unilateral contract. An implied-in-fact contract, 
like an express contract, requires an offer, acceptance of the offer, and 
consideration supporting the contract.94 Unlike an express contract, an 
implied contract may arise even though the parties have not expressly 
agreed to the terms of the contract.95 A court discerns the terms of the 
                                                                                                                     
 92. N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 564-B:1-111A(a). 
 93. Id. § 564-B:1-111A(d). 
 94. See 1 E. ALLAN FARNSWORTH, FARNSWORTH ON CONTRACTS §§ 3.10, 3.14 (3d ed. 
2004). 
 95. See id. § 3.14. 
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implied contract from the parties’ communications and conduct.96 
In traditional contract analysis, a contract may be either bilateral or 
unilateral. A bilateral contract involves mutual promises to perform.97 A 
unilateral contract, however, involves a promise that a party accepts by 
performance, rather than by a promise to perform.98 
As mentioned above, this Article argues that a will is an implied 
unilateral contract between the testator and the state.99 The state offers to 
pass the testator’s property at his death to his preferred donees. The 
testator accepts this offer by creating and prudently managing his wealth. 
At the time the testator executes his will, the terms of the will “form[] an 
integrated whole with the [donative freedom] agreement.”100 
This argument borrows heavily from the law governing the workplace 
relationship between a firm and its worker. For example, consider the 
retention bonus as an implied unilateral contract. Assume that in January 
of a given year, an employer posts a notice proclaiming that it will pay a 
10% bonus in December of that year to any present employee who 
remains employed with the firm at that future date. Might this notice give 
rise to contractual liability on the part of the employer?  
Nearly a century ago, the North Carolina Supreme Court held on those 
facts that the employer might be contractually liable. In Roberts v. Mays 
Mills, Inc.,101 the court concluded that the firm’s announcement of its 
intention to pay a retention bonus was “not a gift or gratuity.”102 Rather, 
the announcement constituted an offer by the employer, which the 
employee accepted by his “setting in to work until the end of the year.”103 
The court further noted that the offer was not a selfless act on the part of 
the employer. Rather, the court reasoned, the employer offered the 
retention bonus “to procure efficient and faithful service and continuous 
employment,”104 which might be a special concern during a time of labor 
shortages.105 Courts have reached this same result—finding an implied 
                                                                                                                     
 96. Id. § 3.10. 
 97. Id. §§ 2.3, 3.4. 
 98. Id.; see also Woolley v. Hoffmann-La Roche, Inc., 491 A.2d 1257, 1267 (N.J. 1985). 
 99. See supra notes 21–25 and accompanying text. 
 100. James Family Charitable Found. v. State St. Bank & Tr. Co., 956 N.E.2d 243, 248 
(Mass. App. Ct. 2011) (“State Street [, a custodian,] agreed to transfer assets in accordance with 
instructions from James [, a donor,] in the future. . . . Once James gave such instructions 
[identifying the donee], they supplemented the agreement and identified State Street’s obligations 
with respect to the particular asset to be transferred. In other words, once received, the instructions 
formed an integrated whole with the agreement.”). 
 101. 114 S.E. 530 (N.C. 1922). 
 102. Id. at 532. 
 103. Id. 
 104. Id. 
 105. See id. at 533 (quoting Zwolanek v. Baker Mfg. Co., 137 N.W. 769, 772 (Wis. 1912)). 
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unilateral contract—using similar reasoning in cases in which an 
employer had promised to pay “dismissal wages” or severance pay if the 
employer terminated an employee in a reduction in force.106 
From the line of cases finding an implied unilateral contract in a 
promise of retention or dismissal pay evolved a line of cases finding an 
implied unilateral contract (often promising job security) in an employee 
handbook.107 Typically, an employee handbook contains a company’s 
personnel policies and procedures. The treatment of employee handbooks 
as implied unilateral contracts between employers and employees 
illustrates the concept at the heart of this Article’s argument: a will is an 
implied unilateral contract. 
Woolley v. Hoffmann-La Roche108 is a seminal case holding that the 
policies and procedures contained in an employment manual may give 
rise to contractual liability.109 Richard Woolley sued Hoffman-La Roche 
for breach of contract after Hoffman-La Roche terminated his 
employment.110 Woolley did not have a written employment contract 
with Hoffman-La Roche.111 Rather, he argued that “the express and 
implied promises in [Hoffman-La Roche]’s employment manual created 
a contract” that allowed the employer to terminate his employment only 
for just cause and only after it followed the procedures outlined in the 
employment manual.112 More specifically, Woolley argued that his 
employer’s representations in its employment manual with respect to job 
security constituted an offer that he accepted by continuing his 
employment with the employer.113 Thus, when the employer terminated 
                                                                                                                     
 106. See, e.g., Cain v. Allen Elec. & Equip. Co., 78 N.W.2d 296, 300, 302 (Mich. 1956) 
(“[T]he adoption of the described [severance] policies by the company constituted an offer of a 
contract. . . . ‘[T]he plaintiff accepted [this offer] . . . by continuing in its employment beyond the 
5-year period specified . . . .’” (quoting the trial court’s decision)); Hercules Powder Co. v. 
Brookfield, 53 S.E.2d 804, 808 (Va. 1949) (“Ample authority sustains the view that such a 
promise amounts to an offer, which, if accepted by performance of the service, fulfills the legal 
requirements of a contract.”). 
 107. See Toussaint v. Blue Cross & Blue Shield of Mich., 292 N.W.2d 880, 893 (Mich. 1980) 
(approving the reasoning from Cain); Woolley v. Hoffmann-La Roche, Inc., 491 A.2d 1257, 
1267–68 (N.J. 1985) (approving the reasoning from Toussaint). 
 108. 491 A.2d 1257 (N.J. 1985). 
 109. Id. at 1258; see also J.H. Verkerke, The Story of Woolley v. Hoffmann-La Roche: 
Finding a Way to Enforce Employee Handbook Promises, in EMPLOYMENT LAW STORIES 23, 24, 
62 (Samuel Estreicher & Gillian Lester eds., 2007) (noting the “significant role” that Woolley 
played in establishing the principle that a statement in an employment manual may form the basis 
for an implied unilateral contract between employer and employee). 
 110. Woolley, 491 A.2d at 1258.  
 111. Id. 
 112. Id. 
 113. See Verkerke, supra note 109, at 41–42 (discussing the specifics of Woolley’s 
complaint).  
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his employment without just cause and without following specified 
procedures, the employer breached an implied unilateral contract.114 The 
New Jersey Supreme Court agreed with Woolley’s argument that the 
termination clauses and procedures in the employer’s handbook could be 
contractually binding.115  
The court first concluded that the termination provisions in the manual 
could constitute an offer by the employer.116 The court reasoned that the 
context in which the employer distributed and maintained the manual 
made it “almost inevitable” that an employee would believe that the 
employer had agreed to undertake certain legally enforceable 
obligations.117 Given the circumstances, the court concluded, the 
employer could not avoid the contract merely by asserting that it did not 
intend to be bound by the provisions in the employment manual: “Our 
courts will not allow an employer to offer attractive inducements and 
benefits to the workforce and then withdraw them when it chooses, no 
matter how sincere its belief that they are not enforceable.”118 
Second, the court concluded that the employee’s job performance 
could serve as both acceptance of and consideration for the unilateral 
contract, thereby making the employer’s promises concerning job 
security a binding commitment.119 Indeed, the court held that in certain 
circumstances an employment manual’s job security provisions become 
binding at the time the employer distributes the manual, and the court 
suggested in dictum that this might be so even if the employee is not 
aware of the manual’s existence.120 In support of its holding, the New 
Jersey Supreme Court approvingly quoted at length the Michigan 
Supreme Court’s dictum in an earlier influential case—Toussaint v. Blue 
Cross & Blue Shield of Michigan121—discussing the effect of an 
employer’s distribution of an employment manual and why an employee 
                                                                                                                     
 114. See Woolley, 491 A.2d at 1258; Verkerke, supra note 109, at 41–42.  
 115. Woolley, 491 A.2d at 1258, 1264 (“[A]bsent a clear and prominent disclaimer, an 
implied promise contained in an employment manual that an employee will be fired only for cause 
may be enforceable against an employer even when the employment is for an indefinite term and 
would otherwise be terminable at will.”). 
 116. Id. at 1265. 
 117. Id. at 1265–66 (“Having been employed, like hundreds of his co-employees, without 
any individual employment contract, by an employer whose good reputation made it so attractive, 
the employee is given this one document that purports to set forth the terms and conditions of his 
employment, a document obviously carefully prepared by the company with all of the appearances 
of corporate legitimacy that one could imagine.”).  
 118. Id. at 1266. 
 119. Id. at 1266–67 (concluding that “the manual is an offer that seeks the formation of a 
unilateral contract—the employees’ bargained-for action needed to make the offer binding being 
their continued work when they have no obligation to continue”). 
 120. See id. at 1268 n.10. 
 121. 292 N.W.2d 880 (Mich. 1980). 
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should not be required to prove actual reliance on the handbook provision 
that the employee seeks to enforce: 
While an employer need not establish personnel policies or 
practices, where an employer chooses to establish such 
policies and practices and makes them known to its 
employees, the employment relationship is presumably 
enhanced. The employer secures an orderly, cooperative and 
loyal work force, and the employee the peace of mind 
associated with job security and the conviction that he will 
be treated fairly. No pre-employment negotiations need take 
place and the parties’ minds need not meet on the subject; 
nor does it matter that the employee knows nothing of the 
particulars of the employer’s policies and practices or that 
the employer may change them unilaterally. It is enough that 
the employer chooses, presumably in its own interest, to 
create an environment in which the employee believes that, 
whatever[] the personnel policies and practices, they are 
established and official at any given time, purport to be fair, 
and are applied consistently and uniformly to each 
employee. The employer has then created a situation 
“instinct with an obligation.”122 
Thus, under Toussaint and Woolley, an employer that promulgates an 
employment policy for the purpose of improving employee performance 
and morale may not later argue that its promise is illusory.123  
                                                                                                                     
 122. Woolley, 491 A.2d at 1268 (quoting Toussaint, 292 N.W.2d at 892). In Toussaint, the 
Michigan Supreme Court held that an employee’s claim of wrongful discharge might properly be 
based upon the employee’s “legitimate expectations grounded in his employer’s written policy 
statements set forth in the manual of personnel policies.” 292 N.W.2d at 885. The court further 
held that such policy statements “can give rise to contractual rights in employees without evidence 
that the parties mutually agreed that the policy statements would create contractual rights in the 
employee.” Id. at 892. 
The Toussaint court borrowed the phrase “instinct with an obligation” from Judge Benjamin 
Cardozo. See Toussaint, 292 N.W.2d at 892 (quoting Wood v. Lucy, Lady Duff-Gordon, 118 N.E. 
214, 214 (N.Y. 1917)). Judge Cardozo borrowed the phrase from another jurist. See Wood, 118 
N.E. at 214 (quoting McCall Co. v. Wright, 117 N.Y.S. 775, 779 (N.Y. App. Div. 1909)). 
 123. See Toussaint, 292 N.W.2d at 895 (“Having announced the policy, presumably with a 
view to obtaining the benefit of improved employee attitudes and behavior and improved quality 
of the work force, the employer may not treat its promise as illusory.”); Woolley, 491 A.2d at 
1271 (“It would be unfair to allow an employer to distribute a policy manual that makes the 
workforce believe that certain promises have been made and then to allow the employer to renege 
on those promises.”); see also Hunter v. Bd. of Trs. of Broadlawns Med. Ctr., 481 N.W.2d 510, 
513, 515 (Iowa 1992) (asserting that “[i]n exchange for the employer’s guarantee not to discharge 
in the absence of cause or certain specified conditions, the employer reaps the benefits of a more 
secure and presumably more productive work force” and holding that representations of job 
security in an employment manual may give rise to contractual liability); Thompson v. St. Regis 
Paper Co., 685 P.2d 1081, 1087–88 (Wash. 1984) (concluding “that the principal, though not 
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Following Woolley, the vast majority of U.S. jurisdictions have firmly 
established the principle that statements in employer-promulgated 
handbooks may serve as the basis for contractual protection.124 As one 
commentator put it, Woolley “has become part of the fabric of 
contemporary employment law. The proposition for which it stands is 
now utterly unremarkable. This legal principle is so widely accepted that 
we note today only the few isolated jurisdictions that still refuse to 
enforce employee handbook promises.”125 Many of the jurisdictions that 
have enforced employee handbook promises have justified the decision 
using an implied unilateral contract theory.126 Pursuant to implied 
unilateral contract theory in its broadest form: (1) the employment 
manual promise does not have to be explicit; it can be implied;127 (2) the 
                                                                                                                     
exclusive, reason employers issue such manuals is to create an atmosphere of fair treatment and 
job security for their employees” and holding that an employer’s creation of such an atmosphere 
may give rise to “an obligation of treatment in accord with [its] written promises”). 
 124. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF EMPLOYMENT LAW § 2.05 Reporters’ Notes cmt. a (AM. LAW 
INST. 2014) (adopting “the position of the clear majority of U.S. jurisdictions (39 of 51, as of the 
May 2014 approval of this Restatement) that unilateral employer policy statements can, in 
appropriate circumstances, establish binding employer obligations”); Verkerke, supra note 109, 
at 23; Stephen F. Befort, Employee Handbooks and the Legal Effect of Disclaimers, 13 INDUS. 
REL. L.J. 326, 328 (1992); Kenneth G. Dau-Schmidt & Timothy A. Haley, Governance of the 
Workplace: The Contemporary Regime of Individual Contract, 28 COMP. LAB. L. & POL’Y J. 313, 
344 (2007) (noting that “[f]orty-two jurisdictions allow employee rights arising from implied-in-
fact contracts” and that “[t]he implied contract exception [to at-will employment] most often 
arises in the context of employee handbooks”); see also, e.g., Cont’l Airlines, Inc. v. Keenan, 731 
P.2d 708, 711 (Colo. 1987); Duldulao v. Saint Mary of Nazareth Hosp. Ctr., 505 N.E.2d 314, 317 
(Ill. 1987) (stating that “the overwhelming majority of courts considering the issue have held that 
an employee handbook may, under proper circumstances, be contractually binding” and citing 
more than two dozen cases in support of this assertion); Hunter, 481 N.W.2d at 515–16; Libby v. 
Calais Reg’l Hosp., 554 A.2d 1181, 1183 (Me. 1989).  
 125. Verkerke, supra note 109, at 62. 
 126. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF EMPLOYMENT LAW § 2.05 Reporters’ Notes cmt. b (AM. LAW 
INST. 2014) (citing case law from sixteen jurisdictions “us[ing] some form of unilateral-contract 
analysis” to enforce employer promises contained in employee handbooks); see Befort, supra note 
124, at 340–42; see also, e.g., Keenan, 731 P.2d at 711 & n.1 (noting the use of unilateral contracts 
in termination procedures); Hunter, 481 N.W.2d at 513 (illustrating that use of an employer’s 
handbook may constitute a unilateral contract); Pine River State Bank v. Mettille, 333 N.W.2d 
622, 627 (Minn. 1983) (describing when an employer’s handbook becomes a unilateral contract). 
To be more precise, although in some cases both the employer’s offer and the employee’s 
acceptance are implied, more typically the employer’s offer is express and only the employee’s 
acceptance is implied. See 1 FARNSWORTH, supra note 94, § 3.14a (making this point generally 
with respect to implied-in-fact employment contracts). 
 127. See, e.g., Wiskotoni v. Mich. Nat’l Bank-W., 716 F.2d 378, 385 (6th Cir. 1983) 
(construing Michigan Supreme Court precedent as holding that employer policies and practices 
can give rise to an implied contractual right to just-cause employment and citing lower Michigan 
court cases consistent with the holding). 
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employee’s continued work constitutes her acceptance of the contract;128 
(3) the employee’s continued work constitutes her consideration given 
for the contract;129 and (4) pursuant to a presumed enhancement theory, 
courts utilize a presumed acceptance fiction and a presumed 
consideration fiction—the employee need not even know about the 
contract; all that is necessary is that the employer has created a work 
environment that is “instinct with an obligation.”130 
The implied unilateral contract theory that courts have applied to find 
a contractual relationship in the context of employee handbooks can be 
applied with similar effect in the context of a state probate code governing 
the passing of property at death. In the latter context, the state has created 
an environment that is instinct with an obligation.131 Central to this 
argument is an understanding of why donative freedom is the keystone of 
American inheritance law. This understanding sheds light not only on the 
state’s motive in offering to respect donative intent but also on the 
donor’s means of accepting and providing consideration for the donative 
freedom contract. 
A long-understood and widely accepted rationale for freedom of 
testation is that donative freedom is an incentive to industry and saving.132 
                                                                                                                     
 128. See, e.g., Keenan, 731 P.2d at 711; Duldulao, 505 N.E.2d at 318; Hunter, 481 N.W.2d 
at 513; Pine River State Bank, 333 N.W.2d at 627. 
 129. See, e.g., Sisco v. GSA Nat’l Capital Fed. Credit Union, 689 A.2d 52, 56–57 (D.C. Cir. 
1997); Keenan, 731 P.2d at 711; Duldulao, 505 N.E.2d at 318; Hunter, 481 N.W.2d at 513–14; 
Pine River State Bank, 333 N.W.2d at 627; see also 1 FARNSWORTH, supra note 94, § 2.10 
(discussing consideration in at-will employment). 
 130. See 1 FARNSWORTH, supra note 94, § 2.10a; see also Kinoshita v. Canadian Pac. 
Airlines, Ltd., 724 P.2d 110, 117–18 (Haw. 1986) (holding that the employer’s rules “constitute 
a contract enforceable by the employees” and reasoning that “[i]nasmuch as [the employer] 
circulated the rules with an intention ‘to create expectations and induce reliance by employees as 
a group[,]’ it ‘should not be able to escape liability on the grounds that a particular employee was 
unaware of the [rules] and thus did not receive a promise’” (quoting Mark Pettit, Jr., Modern 
Unilateral Contracts, 63 B.U. L. REV. 551, 583 (1983) (last two alterations in original)); Woolley 
v. Hoffmann-La Roche, Inc., 491 A.2d 1257, 1268 & n.10 (N.J. 1985) (describing when an 
employer has created a situation instinct with an obligation); Taylor v. Nat’l Life Ins. Co., 652 
A.2d 466, 471 (Vt. 1993) (holding “that personnel manual provisions inconsistent with an at-will 
relationship may be used as evidence that the contract of employment requires good cause for 
termination despite the fact that the manual was not part of the initial employment agreement,” 
recognizing “that this holding draws on aspects of both unilateral contract formation and 
promissory estoppel,” and expressly agreeing with the rationale of Toussaint). 
 131. Wood v. Lucy, Lady Duff-Gordon, 118 N.E. 214, 214 N.Y. (1917). 
 132. See, e.g., ATKINSON, supra note 29, at 34 (listing “a plan of forced inheritance might 
discourage individual initiative and thrift” as one of the “grave disadvantages to a rule which 
would forbid an owner any freedom of determining where his property shall go upon his death”); 
Edward C. Halbach, Jr., An Introduction to Chapters 1-4, in DEATH, TAXES AND FAMILY 
PROPERTY, supra note 19, at 3, 4 (noting that some have argued that freedom of testation is “an 
encouragement to industry and thrift”).  
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The state grants to each citizen the right to control the disposition of his 
property at death “as an incentive to bring forth creativity, hard work, 
initiative and ultimately productivity that benefits others.”133 This 
freedom of disposition serves also as an inducement “to save rather than 
to consume, and to go on saving long after [one’s] own lifelong future 
needs are provided for.”134 Individuals’ savings are thought to be 
critically important to the health of the overall economy.135 
Professors Adam J. Hirsch and William K.S. Wang have described the 
industry and thrift justification for testamentary freedom: 
One argument, tracing back to the thirteenth century jurist 
Henry de Bracton, if not earlier, holds that freedom of 
testation creates an incentive to industry and saving. 
Bracton’s assumption—shared by modern social 
scientists—was that persons derive satisfaction out of 
bequeathing property to others. To the extent that lawmakers 
deny persons the opportunity to bequeath freely, the 
subjective value of property will drop, for one of its potential 
uses will have disappeared. As a result, thwarted testators 
will choose to accumulate less property, and the total stock 
of wealth existing at any given time will shrink. 
Testamentary freedom accordingly fulfills the normative 
goal of wealth maximization, which is advanced by its 
proponents as the best available barometer of utility 
maximization.136 
Thus, a principal reason why the state offers in its probate code to 
distribute a future decedent’s property in accordance with the property 
owner’s expressed or implied wishes is quite similar to a principal reason 
why an employer offers in an employee handbook to provide a measure 
of job security to its worker. In both cases, the offeror hopes to induce a 
more productive workforce. Moreover, the property owner accepts and 
provides consideration for the donative freedom contract in a manner 
similar to that by which an employee accepts the unilateral contract for 
job security in an employee handbook. In both cases, the offeree’s 
performance in the form of hard work constitutes her acceptance of the 
contract and her consideration given for the contract. More precisely, the 
property owner accepts the state’s offer to honor his donative intent and 
provides consideration for the donative freedom contract by being 
                                                                                                                     
 133. Halbach, supra note 131, at 5. 
 134. Id. at 6. 
 135. Id. (explaining that “savings of individuals are vital to the economy’s capital base and 
thus to its level of employment and to the productivity of other individuals”). 
 136. Adam J. Hirsch & William K.S. Wang, A Qualitative Theory of the Dead Hand, 68 IND. 
L.J. 1, 7–8 (1992) (footnotes omitted); see also id. at 16 (discussing the productivity-incentive 
theory of testamentary freedom as applied to the right to bequeath future interests). 
25
Spitko: The Will As An Implied Unilateral Arbitration Contract
Published by UF Law Scholarship Repository, 2016
74 FLORIDA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 68 
 
economically productive and by saving and investing his estate rather 
than consuming it. 
Under the broad reasoning of Woolley and its progeny, it is of no 
moment to the implied unilateral contract analysis that a particular 
testator or indeed the citizenry in general is ignorant of the specifics of 
the probate code. It is sufficient that the citizenry has a general sense that 
the government respects the right of each person to do as she pleases with 
her property at death. The American citizenry certainly does have this 
sense.137 The right to pass property at death by will is so much a part of 
the American culture that any alternative seems unthinkable.138 Professor 
Ray D. Madoff has observed with respect to this point: 
If you ask an American about the legal rights of dead 
people, you will probably get an answer having to do with 
[living] people’s rights to control who gets their property 
after they die. This right to control the disposition of 
property at death is central to the American psyche. 
Although people are often vague in their understanding 
about many aspects of the law, one thing they do know is 
that they can write a will that controls who will—and who 
will not—get their property after they die.139 
Given that the state has chosen to establish a right to pass one’s 
property at death and has made this right known to the citizenry, the 
productivity of the state’s citizens “is presumably enhanced.”140 The state 
secures a productive citizenry, and the productive citizen enjoys the peace 
of mind that comes from knowing that the state will respect her donative 
wishes at her death. To paraphrase the Michigan Supreme Court in 
Toussaint, “No [ante-mortem] negotiations need take place and the 
parties’ minds need not meet on the subject; nor does it matter that the 
[donor] knows nothing of the particulars of the [probate code] or that the 
[state] may change them unilaterally.”141 All that is required is that the 
state has chosen “to create an environment in which the [donor] believes 
                                                                                                                     
 137. See, e.g., MADOFF, supra note 21, at 57–58 (asserting that most Americans view the 
right to control the passing of their property at their death “as essential to the very notion of private 
property”). 
 138. See, e.g., Friedman, supra note 19, at 19 (noting American familiarity with wills and 
adding that “[t]he law of inheritance has its technical side; but its basic institutions (the will, for 
example) are widely known, and accepted as part of the machinery of life”); MADOFF, supra note 
21, at 57 (commenting on how the American arts frequently explore the theme of one’s ability to 
control the disposition of one’s property at death and the related theme of how this right enables 
one to exert control over others during one’s life). 
 139. MADOFF, supra note 21, at 57. 
 140. See Toussaint v. Blue Cross & Blue Shield of Mich., 292 N.W.2d 880, 892 (Mich. 
1980). 
 141. See id. (footnote omitted). 
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that, whatever the [probate code specifics], they are established and 
official at any given time, purport to be fair, and are applied consistently 
and uniformly to each [donor]. The [state] has then created a situation 
‘instinct with an obligation.’”142 
 
To be sure, courts and commentators have raised serious objections to 
Woolley and its progeny.143 The principal criticism centers on the 
understanding that traditional unilateral contract doctrine requires that the 
offeror communicate an offer to the offeree and that the offeree 
commence his performance in exchange for the offered terms.144 That is, 
in the traditional case of a unilateral contract, the offeror must seek the 
offeree’s performance in exchange for the offeror’s promise, and the 
offeree must give his performance in exchange for that promise.145 
Certainly then, under traditional contract doctrine, no contract exists 
when the offeree performs without knowledge of the offer.146  
Under Woolley and its progeny, however, a court implies the offer, 
acceptance, and consideration elements rather than require an intent of 
the parties147: In most cases of employee handbooks, the employer does 
not intend to make an offer by circulating its employment manual, and 
the employee does not mean for her continued employment to serve as 
acceptance of an offer or consideration for the promise.148 Thus, the 
Woolley doctrine employs legal fictions pursuant to which the court 
presumes an offer, acceptance, and consideration.149 
In defense of Woolley, courts make use of those legal fictions in light 
                                                                                                                     
 142. See id. (quoting Wood v. Lucy, Lady Duff-Gordon, 118 N.E. 214, 214 (N.Y. 1917)).  
 143. See, e.g., RESTATEMENT OF EMPLOYMENT LAW § 2.05 cmt. b (AM. LAW INST. 2015) 
(calling application of unilateral contract theory in the case of employee handbooks “a 
conceptually awkward fit,” noting that employees rarely are aware of the terms of employer-
issued statements, asserting that “traditional principles of consideration and bargained-for 
exchange rarely, if ever, apply when the employer’s unilateral statements are not made in response 
to a prospective employee’s expressed concerns or an employee’s threat to resign,” and resting its 
endorsement of enforcement of employee handbook promises on “general estoppel principles” 
rather than unilateral contract theory). 
 144. See id.  
 145. 1 FARNSWORTH, supra note 94, § 3.4.  
 146. See, e.g., Broadnax v. Ledbetter, 99 S.W. 1111, 1111–12 (Tex. 1907) (holding that no 
contract to pay a reward existed where the citizen who captured and returned an escaped prisoner 
did so without knowledge of the offer of a reward). 
 147. See Verkerke, supra note 109, at 55; Befort, supra note 124, at 341–43. 
 148. See Befort, supra note 124, at 343; see also 1 FARNSWORTH, supra note 94, § 2.10 
(noting that in employee handbook cases, “there is rarely any evidence that the promise played 
any role in the employee not quitting” and concluding that “[t]hese cases represent a significant 
erosion of the requirement of bargain”). 
 149. See Verkerke, supra note 109, at 55; Befort, supra note 124, at 341 (explaining how the 
court in Pine River State Bank implied the offer, acceptance, and communication). 
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of the practical realities that: (1) employers distribute employment 
manuals to their employees in part to enhance the employment 
relationship; and (2) employee handbooks further this goal in part 
because employers encourage workers to rely on the promissory 
statements set forth in these handbooks.150 Therefore, implying a 
unilateral contract prevents the unjust enrichment of the employer who 
secures a motivated and compliant workforce by inducing worker 
reliance on its promissory statements.151 
Moreover, the criticism of the law’s reliance on legal fictions to 
supply an offer, acceptance, and consideration in the context of a job 
security provision in an employee handbook arguably has much less force 
in the context of the donative freedom contract. In contrast to the typical 
employer, which ordinarily does not intend to make an offer of job 
security when it issues an employee handbook,152 the state does intend 
and expect to be bound by the offer in its probate code to pass a property 
owner’s estate at his death to his preferred donees. Also, given that a 
principal justification for the respect that the state shows for donative 
freedom is the belief that such donative freedom serves as an incentive 
for industry and thrift,153 the state more realistically should be understood 
as seeking the property owner’s performance in exchange for the state’s 
promise to respect donative freedom.  
Further, compared to the typical employee, who ordinarily does not 
intend by her continued employment to accept or provide consideration 
for the employer’s “offer” of job security contained in an employee 
handbook, it seems more realistic to impute to the typical property 
owner—especially one who executes a will—an intent to accept the 
state’s offer by being economically productive and by saving and 
investing her estate rather than consuming her estate. As discussed above, 
the typical citizen is likely to appreciate that she is free to dispose of her 
property at her death as she sees fit.154 The citizen who executes a will 
evidences this understanding by the very act of executing the will. Again, 
given the understanding that donative freedom is an incentive to industry 
and saving, the property owner more realistically should be understood 
                                                                                                                     
 150. See Befort, supra note 124, at 337–39. 
 151. See id. at 339, 343, 370; see also Robert C. Bird, Employment as a Relational Contract, 
8 U. PA. J. LAB. & EMP. L. 149, 199, 207–08 (2005) (arguing for the enforcement of workplace 
norms pursuant to relational contract theory, citing to the Toussaint court’s use of implied contract 
doctrine as an example of a court applying relational principles in the employment context, and 
explaining that “an employer commits relational opportunism when it encourages employee 
loyalty through implied promises of job security and fair treatment and then retracts that security 
and fair treatment when they prove inconvenient”). 
 152. Befort, supra note 124, at 343.  
 153. See supra notes 131–35 and accompanying text. 
 154. See supra notes 136–38 and accompanying text. 
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as truly giving her performance in exchange for the state’s promise to 
respect her wishes for the disposition of her property at death. Moreover, 
the fact that the property owner has multiple motivations for acquiring 
and preserving her assets does not prevent the performance from serving 
as consideration for the state’s donative freedom promise.155 Thus, the 
case for applying the Woolley framework is much stronger in the context 
of inheritance than it is in the employee handbook context in which courts 
have widely accepted it.156 
 
                                                                                                                     
 155. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 81(2) (AM. LAW INST. 1981) (“The fact 
that a promise does not of itself induce a performance or return promise does not prevent the 
performance or return promise from being consideration for the promise.”). What of the property 
owner who shows industry and thrift, but is not motivated whatsoever by the state’s offer of 
donative freedom? Alternatively, what of the spendthrift sloth who does her best to waste all that 
she has received and to avoid any productive activity? Such property owners would be similarly 
situated to most employees under the broad reading of Woolley and its progeny in that they do not 
truly mean for their actions to constitute acceptance of or consideration for the implied unilateral 
contract. Thus, under Woolley and its progeny, the court will imply such property owners’ 
acceptance and consideration. Cf. 1 FARNSWORTH, supra note 94, § 3.14a (“Although such 
holdings are a radical departure from traditional contract law, they produce the salutary result that 
all employees—those who read the handbook and those who did not—are treated alike.”). The 
spendthrift sloth who manages to dissipate her entire fortune would be treated like an employee 
who is offered job security but quits her employment. 
 156. Applying unilateral contract theory in the inheritance law context should not preclude 
the state from modifying its probate code from time to time. Again, the law of employee 
handbooks is instructive. A substantial number of jurisdictions have held that an employer may 
prospectively modify a binding policy statement by providing affected employees with reasonable 
advance notice of the modification. See RESTATEMENT OF EMPLOYMENT LAW § 2.06 Reporters’ 
Notes cmt. a (AM. LAW INST. 2015) (endorsing the position that “[a]bsent circumstances giving 
rise to nonmodifiable . . . or accrued employee rights, . . . [where] employer obligations are 
predicated solely on prior unilateral statements[, such obligations] can be modified or rescinded 
prospectively by the same mechanism that created them—unilateral employer promulgation with 
reasonable advance notice given to affected employees” and citing numerous cases in support); 
see also Asmus v. Pac. Bell, 999 P.2d 71, 76, 81 (Cal. 2000) (holding that “[a]n employer may 
terminate a written employment security policy that contains a specified condition, if the condition 
is one of indefinite duration and the employer makes the change after a reasonable time, on 
reasonable notice, and without interfering with the employees’ vested benefits” and noting that 
“the majority of other jurisdictions that have addressed the question” have reached a similar 
conclusion). 
Moreover, the fact that the property owner may alter the specific terms of the donative 
freedom contract from time to time—by execution, revocation, or amendment of his will or 
codicil—does not preclude contract formation. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS 
§ 34(1) (AM. LAW INST. 1981) (“The terms of a contract may be reasonably certain even though 
it empowers one or both parties to make a selection of terms in the course of performance.”); id. 
§ 34 cmt. a (“A bargain may be concluded which leaves a choice of terms to be made by one party 
or the other. If the agreement is otherwise sufficiently definite to be a contract, it is not made 
invalid by the fact that it leaves particulars of performance to be specified by one of the parties.”). 
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III.  THE INSIGNIFICANCE OF THE DONEE’S LACK OF  
CONSENT TO ARBITRATE 
Even if one accepts that a will is a contract within the purview of the 
FAA and state arbitration statutes, one might still object to testator-
compelled arbitration given that a will contestant is not a party to that 
contract. The implied unilateral contract that contains the express 
arbitration clause—the will—is between the testator and the state. Neither 
the testator’s legatee or devisee under the will nor his heir pursuant to the 
intestacy statutes is a party to the donative freedom contract entered into 
between the donor and the state.157 Neither has consented, therefore, to 
the will’s arbitration clause. Given arbitration dogma that “arbitration is 
a creature of contract”158 and the reality that neither the will beneficiary 
nor the heir has contracted to arbitrate her will contest, the argument must 
be addressed that it would be inappropriate therefore to compel either the 
will beneficiary or the heir to arbitrate her challenge to the testator’s will. 
One virtue of conceptualizing a will as a contract between the testator 
and the state is that doing so brings into sharp relief the true nature of the 
will beneficiary and the heir with respect to the arbitration clause in that 
contract.159 These donees are bystanders to the contracting process. They 
are third-party beneficiaries of the donative freedom contract between the 
property owner and the state. Appreciating this true nature of the donee 
allows for a better understanding of the arguments that compelling a 
donee to arbitrate his will contest when he has not agreed to arbitrate is 
consistent with both the law of wills and the law of arbitration. 
As for the law of wills, it is well-established in the law of donative 
transfers that the rights of the donee are derivative of and subordinate to 
the rights of the testator.160 The testator’s right to disinherit his children 
                                                                                                                     
 157. Cf. Martz’s Ex’r v. Martz’s Heirs, 66 Va. (25 Gratt.) 361, 365 (1874) (“The legatees are 
parties interested in the will, but they are in no sense parties to the making of it.”). 
 158. United Steelworkers of Am. v. Am. Mfg. Co., 363 U.S. 564, 570–71 (1960) (“[S]ince 
arbitration is a creature of contract, a court must always inquire, when a party seeks to invoke its 
aid to force a reluctant party to the arbitration table, whether the parties have agreed to arbitrate 
the particular dispute.”); see also Rent-A-Center, W., Inc. v. Jackson, 561 U.S. 63, 67 (2010) 
(“The FAA reflects the fundamental principle that arbitration is a matter of contract.”); AT&T 
Techs., Inc. v. Commc’ns Workers of Am., 475 U.S. 643, 648 (1986) (noting that arbitration is a 
matter of contract).  
 159. Cf. Strong, Arbitration of Trust Disputes, supra note 4, at 1174 (“Although theory can 
often seem entirely divorced from the practice of law, this [issue of mandatory trust arbitration] 
is one instance where the manner in which a device [(the trust)] is conceptualized can make a 
difference in how it is treated in court.”). 
 160. See In re Morgan’s Estate, 72 A. 498, 499 (Pa. 1909) (discussing the justification for 
enforcement of a trust spendthrift provision and commenting that “[i]t is always to be remembered 
that consideration for the beneficiary does not even in the remotest way enter into the policy of 
the law. It has regard solely to the rights of the donor.”); Spitko, Protecting the Abhorrent 
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serves as the most powerful example of this principle. As Professor 
Edward C. Halbach Jr. has stated, “inheritance may grant wealth to 
donees without regard to their competence and performance, but the 
economic reasons for allowing inheritance are viewed in terms of proper 
rewards and socially valuable incentives to the donor.”161 In the context 
of testator-compelled arbitration, this first principle speaks to the 
unfairness argument—it would be unfair to force the will beneficiary to 
arbitrate her will contest when the beneficiary has not consented to the 
arbitral forum. There can be no unfairness or unconscionability arising 
from a donor conditioning his gift on the donee’s consent to arbitrate any 
dispute relating to the gift.162 
Indeed, American inheritance law guarantees the testator tremendous 
latitude in attaching conditions to her donative transfer.163 The sole 
limitation is that the condition must not violate public policy.164 In 
general, courts have applied this limitation sparingly.165 Courts have 
noted frequently in upholding conditions on testamentary gifts that “since 
the heirs could have been disinherited entirely, they cannot complain 
about having conditions imposed on their bequests.”166 
 
Thus, it is fully in accord with the law of donative transfers that the 
                                                                                                                     
Testator, supra note 6, at 300 (arguing that “the heir’s or putative legatee’s ‘rights’ in the 
decedent’s property are wholly derivative of the decedent’s right to pass her property to the 
persons of her choosing at her death”); cf. Whalen v. Prosser, 719 So. 2d 2, 6 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 
1998) (explaining with respect to a claim of tortious interference with an expectancy that the “the 
beneficiary is authorized to sue to recover damages primarily to protect the testator’s interest 
rather than the disappointed beneficiary’s expectations”). 
 161. Halbach, supra note 132, at 6. 
 162. See Langbein, supra note 32, at 651 n.136 (“Because the trust deal originates in a gift, 
a unilateral transfer, the concerns about information cost and market failure that motivate 
unconscionability limits on party autonomy for exchange transactions in contract law have less 
sway in trusts.”); Strong, Arbitration of Trust Disputes, supra note 4, at 1241 (“Since there can 
be no inequality of bargaining power in a donative relationship, trust arbitration cannot be 
problematic in this sense.”). 
 163. See Shapira v. Union Nat’l Bank, 315 N.E.2d 825, 826, 832 (Ohio Ct. Com. Pl. 1974) 
(holding that public policy does not preclude a testator from conditioning his gift on the donee 
marrying, within seven years of the testator’s death, a Jewish woman whose parents are both 
Jewish); see also MADOFF, supra note 21, at 6 (“Americans [in passing property at death] are 
largely free to impose whatever conditions they want, and their plans can often be imposed for as 
long as they want, even in perpetuity.”). See generally id. at 72–76 (discussing conditional 
bequests and noting that “American law has been very liberal in terms of allowing individuals 
posthumous control over the behavior of others through the use of conditional trusts”). 
 164. MADOFF, supra note 21, at 73. 
 165. Id. (“[C]ourts have generally been loath to use their authority to restrict these conditions, 
seeing it as outside their bailiwick.”). 
 166. Id. 
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testator may condition his gift on the donee acceding to his direction that 
disputes relating to the gift be resolved by arbitration.167 Indeed, several 
courts in the nineteenth century expressly relied upon conditional gift 
theory in upholding the right of a testator to appoint an arbitrator to 
interpret the testator’s will and to resolve disputes arising under the 
will.168 For example, in 1886, the Supreme Court of West Virginia spoke 
at length on the relationship between testamentary freedom and testator-
compelled arbitration:  
Of course a will is not an agreement between two or more 
contracting parties, but it is certainly no less binding upon 
the parties who take a benefit under it than if they had 
contracted with the testator for that benefit. The testator has 
full dominion over his property with the absolute right, 
subject only to the limitations fixed by law, to do with and 
dispose of it in any manner or to whomever his will or 
caprice may suggest. Within the rules of law he may subject 
it to any limitation, restriction or condition he chooses, and 
the devisee or legatee, if he elects to take under the will, will 
be bound to respect and observe the same. It, therefore, 
seems to me entirely clear that a testator has the power not 
only to appoint a person or arbitrator to interpret and settle 
difficulties among the devisees and legatees growing out of 
the dispositions made by the will, but that he has the right to 
make the decision of such arbiter, if made without fraud or 
corruption, final and conclusive upon the beneficiaries under 
the will.169 
As for the law of arbitration, settled arbitration doctrine provides that 
a court may compel a non-signatory to a contract containing an arbitration 
                                                                                                                     
 167. Cf. Janin, supra note 6, at 525 (“The distinguishing characteristic of such [arbitration] 
provisions is that the interests given by the testator or settlor are conditioned by the terms of his 
will or conveyance. Those who wish to take under the instrument are obliged to submit all disputes 
thereafter arising to arbitration.”). 
 168. See, e.g., Wait v. Huntington, 40 Conn. 9, 11–12 (Conn. 1873) (“It is familiar law that 
a testator may confer on executors and on others absolute power of appointment and disposition 
over his property. So he may annex conditions and qualifications to his bequests not repugnant to 
law and good policy.”); In re Phillips’s Estate, 10 Pa. C. 374, 380 (Orphans’ Ct. 1891) (holding 
that if a testator may designate a third person as an executor, a testator should also have the power 
to designate a third person to address questions of distribution or construction that arise out of his 
will); Moore v. Harper, 27 W. Va. 362, 374 (1886) (noting that with a testator’s right to implement 
restrictions and conditions into his will also comes the right to appoint an arbitrator to interpret 
that will). 
 169. Moore, 27 W. Va. at 374 (emphasis added). 
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clause to arbitrate his claim arising from the contract.170 Indeed, courts 
may use at least six theories to compel a non-signatory to a contract 
containing an arbitration clause to bring any claims under the contract in 
arbitration: (1) agency; (2) alter ego or veil-piercing; (3) assumption; (4) 
incorporation by reference; (5) third-party beneficiary; and (6) equitable 
estoppel.171 Of these, only third-party beneficiary and equitable estoppel 
are relevant to a discussion of testator-compelled arbitration. 
The principal concern in arbitration law with binding a non-signatory 
to an arbitration contract is not that the nonparty has not signed the 
contract. Although the FAA, UAA, and RUAA require a written contract 
or agreement before they apply to an arbitration provision, they do not 
require that the entity against whom it will be enforced sign the writing.172 
Moreover, an enforceable written arbitration contract can arise from an 
implied unilateral contract.173 Thus, an arbitration contract may be 
“written” even though the offeree’s acceptance is implied.174 For 
example, an employee can accept an arbitration contract offered by her 
employer in a written employee handbook by continuing her 
employment.175 
                                                                                                                     
 170. See, e.g., Bridas S.A.P.I.C. v. Gov’t of Turkm., 345 F.3d 347, 355 (5th Cir. 2003); 
Thomson-CSF, S.A. v. Am. Arbitration Ass’n, 64 F.3d 773, 776 (2d Cir. 1995); In re Weekley 
Homes, L.P., 180 S.W.3d 127, 129, 131 (Tex. 2005). 
 171. Bridas, 345 F.3d at 356–63 (listing the six theories and discussing agency, alter ego, 
estoppel, and third-party beneficiary); Thomson-CSF, 64 F.3d at 777–80 (discussing 
incorporation by reference, assumption, agency, alter ego, and estoppel); Rachal v. Reitz, 403 
S.W.3d 840, 846 n.5 (Tex. 2013). 
 172. See, e.g., Tinder v. Pinkerton Sec., 305 F.3d 728, 736 (7th Cir. 2002) (“Although § 3 of 
the FAA requires arbitration agreements to be written, it does not require them to be signed.”); 
Valero Ref., Inc. v. M/T Lauberhorn, 813 F.2d 60, 63–64 (5th Cir. 1987) (affirming that the FAA 
requires a written arbitration agreement but does not require that the parties sign the written 
agreement); Rachal, 403 S.W.3d at 851 (noting that the Texas Arbitration Act requires an 
arbitration provision to be in writing but holding that a court may compel a non-signatory to the 
written arbitration provision to arbitrate her claim arising under the written instrument); Hurley 
v. Fox, 520 So. 2d 467, 467, 469 (La. Ct. App. 1988) (holding that Louisiana’s statute on the 
validity of arbitration agreements requires an arbitration contract to be in writing but does not 
require that the parties sign the contract). 
 173. See, e.g., Seawright v. Am. Gen. Fin. Servs. Inc., 507 F.3d 967, 972 (6th Cir. 2007); 
Metro E. Ctr. for Conditioning & Health v. Qwest Commc’ns Int’l, Inc., 294 F.3d 924, 926 (7th 
Cir. 2002). 
 174. See, e.g., Seawright, 507 F.3d at 978; Caley v. Gulfstream Aerospace Corp., 428 F.3d 
1359, 1369 (11th Cir. 2005). 
 175. See, e.g., Seawright, 507 F.3d at 970 (holding that an employee’s “knowing 
continuation of employment after the effective date of the arbitration program constituted 
acceptance of a valid and enforceable contract to arbitrate”); Caley, 428 F.3d at 1369, 1374; 
Tinder, 305 F.3d at 731, 734 (concluding that an arbitration contract arose from a brochure that 
the employer stuffed into the envelope containing the employee’s paycheck and holding that an 
employee’s continued employment may provide both the employee’s acceptance of the arbitration 
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Rather, the more serious concern with binding a non-signatory to an 
arbitration contract is that the non-signatory has not consented to the 
contract. As the Supreme Court suggested in Arthur Andersen LLP v. 
Carlisle,176 however, pursuant to the FAA a court may compel a nonparty 
to an arbitration contract to arbitrate in accordance with the arbitration 
contract where state contract principles allow a court to enforce the 
contract against the nonparty.177 In Carlisle, the Court considered 
whether a litigant who was not a party to the written arbitration contract 
that other litigants in the case had entered into might be entitled under 
Section 3 of the FAA to a stay of the litigation pending arbitration 
pursuant to the arbitration contract.178 The Court first noted that, in 
general, state contract law determines which arbitration agreements are 
binding under Section 2 of the FAA and enforceable under Section 3 of 
the FAA, and against whom the agreements are enforceable, provided 
that the state contract law “arose to govern issues concerning the validity, 
revocability, and enforceability of contracts generally.”179 The Court 
further noted that “‘traditional principles’ of state law allow a contract to 
be enforced by or against nonparties to the contract through ‘assumption, 
piercing the corporate veil, alter ego, incorporation by reference, third-
party beneficiary theories, waiver and estoppel’”180 Thus, the Court held 
that “a litigant who was not a party to the relevant arbitration agreement 
may invoke § 3 if the relevant state contract law allows him to enforce 
the agreement.”181  
Although Carlisle involved a nonparty to an arbitration contract 
seeking to enforce the contract against parties to the agreement, courts 
may apply Carlisle’s reasoning generally to cases in which a party to an 
arbitration contract seeks to compel arbitration against a nonparty to the 
arbitration contract: under Section 2 of the FAA, state law determines 
                                                                                                                     
contract and the employer’s consideration for the arbitration contract); Brown v. St. Paul Travelers 
Cos., 559 F. Supp. 2d 288, 291 (W.D.N.Y. 2008); In re Halliburton Co., 80 S.W.3d 566, 569 
(Tex. 2002). 
 176. Arthur Andersen LLP v. Carlisle, 556 U.S. 624 (2009). 
 177. See id. at 632.  
 178. Id. at 629. 
 179. Id. at 630–31 (quoting Perry v. Thomas, 482 U.S. 483, 493 n.9 (1987)). 
 180. Id. at 631 (quoting 21 R. LORD, WILLISTON ON CONTRACTS § 57:19 (4th ed. 2001)). 
 181. Id. at 632; see also id. at 631 n.6 (“There is no doubt that, where state law permits it, a 
third-party claim is ‘referable to arbitration under an agreement in writing.’” (quoting 9 U.S.C. 
§ 3 (2012)); Ragone v. Atl. Video at Manhattan Ctr., 595 F.3d 115, 126–27 (2d Cir. 2010) (“Under 
principles of estoppel, a non-signatory to an arbitration agreement may compel a signatory to that 
agreement to arbitrate a dispute” when there exists “a relationship among the parties of a nature 
that justifies a conclusion that the party which agreed to arbitrate with another entity should be 
estopped from denying an obligation to arbitrate a similar dispute with the adversary which is not 
a party to the arbitration agreement” (quoting Sokol Holdings, Inc. v. BMB Munai, Inc., 542 F.3d 
354, 359 (2d. Cir. 2008)). 
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whether an arbitration contract may “be enforced by or against nonparties 
to the contract.”182 Thus, for example, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the 
Fifth Circuit concluded that Carlisle was controlling in a case—Todd v. 
Steamship Mutual Underwriting Ass’n183—in which a party to an 
arbitration contract sought to stay litigation involving a nonparty to the 
arbitration contract and to compel that nonparty to arbitrate his claims 
against the party pursuant to the arbitration agreement.184 
In Todd, Anthony Todd filed a suit against Steamship in Louisiana 
state court to collect on his judgment against his now-insolvent employer 
for injuries he suffered on the job.185 At the time of Todd’s injury, 
Steamship insured Todd’s employer against liability the employer might 
incur because of injuries to its employees.186 Steamship’s insurance 
contract with Todd’s employer contained a clause requiring the employer 
to arbitrate its disputes with Steamship.187 After Steamship removed the 
case to federal court, Steamship sought to stay the litigation and compel 
arbitration.188 
Steamship argued that the court should compel Todd to arbitrate his 
claims against Steamship because those claims derived from the 
employer’s contract with Steamship, which contained an arbitration 
clause.189 In addressing this argument, the Fifth Circuit recognized that 
Carlisle effectively overruled Fifth Circuit precedent that had reasoned 
that “[t]he FAA does not require arbitration unless the parties to a dispute 
have agreed to refer it to arbitration. . . . [and] the mandatory stay 
provision of the FAA does not apply to those who are not contractually 
bound by the arbitration agreement.”190 Accordingly, the Fifth Circuit 
remanded the case to the district court for a determination as to whether 
                                                                                                                     
 182. See Carlisle, 556 U.S. at 631 (“If a written arbitration provision is made enforceable 
against (or for the benefit of) a third party under state contract law, the [FAA]’s terms are 
fulfilled.”). 
 183. 601 F.3d 329 (5th Cir. 2010). 
 184. Id. at 331.  
 185. Id. at 330–31.   
 186. Id. at 331.  
 187. Id.  
 188. Id. 
 189. Id. Steamship brought its motions to stay litigation and compel arbitration pursuant to 
the Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards, commonly 
referred to as the New York Convention. Id. The New York Convention implementing legislation 
incorporates the FAA to the extent that the FAA does not conflict with the Convention. Id. at 331–
32. The Todd court concluded, “Carlisle and other cases discussing whether nonsignatories can 
be compelled to arbitrate under the FAA are relevant for this case governed by the New York 
Convention.” Id. at 334–35.   
 190. Id. at 333 (quoting Zimmerman v. Int’l Cos. & Consulting, Inc., 107 F.3d 344, 346 (5th 
Cir. 1997)). 
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the court could compel Todd to arbitrate as a non-signatory under 
applicable law.191 
Thus, if one accepts that a will is a contract, under the reasoning in 
Carlisle, the FAA will provide for enforcement of testator-compelled 
arbitration so long as state contract law would bind the will contestant to 
the will’s arbitration clause. As asserted above, courts may utilize both 
third-party beneficiary theory and equitable estoppel theory to make the 
will’s arbitration clause binding on the will contestant.192 The two 
theories are similar but distinct. For example, the third-party beneficiary 
doctrine focuses on the intentions of the contracting parties at the time of 
the contract’s execution, while the equitable estoppel doctrine focuses on 
post-contracting conduct.193 
To demonstrate that a nonparty to a contract is a third-party 
beneficiary of the contract, it is not sufficient to show merely that the 
nonparty would benefit incidentally from enforcement of the contract. 
Rather, it must be shown that a party to the contract—or in some 
jurisdictions, both parties to the contract—intended that the nonparty 
benefit from the contract and that performance of the contract would 
complete a gift intended for the nonparty or would satisfy a debt owed to 
the nonparty.194 Courts will bind a third-party beneficiary to a contract’s 
arbitration clause when the claim that the third-party beneficiary seeks to 
assert arises from the contract that contains the arbitration clause and for 
which the third party was the intended beneficiary.195 These principles 
support an argument that the beneficiary of a will and the intestate heir 
should be considered third-party beneficiaries of the donative freedom 
contract, of which the will is a part, and should be bound to arbitrate any 
contest arising under the donative freedom contract that contains an 
arbitration clause. 
It is undeniable that the testator executes her will for the purpose of 
benefitting her will beneficiary and that performance of the will contract 
would complete a gift intended for the beneficiary.196 The cases in which 
                                                                                                                     
 191. Id. at 332. 
 192. See supra note 171 and accompanying text. 
 193. Bridas S.A.P.I.C. v. Gov’t of Turkm., 345 F.3d 347, 362 (5th Cir. 2003); E.I. DuPont 
de Nemours & Co. v. Rhone Poulenc Fiber & Resin Intermediates, S.A.S., 269 F.3d 187, 200 n.7 
(3d Cir. 2001). 
 194. 3 FARNSWORTH, supra note 94, § 10.3. In some jurisdictions, one must also show that 
the contracting parties’ intent to benefit the third party was a material purpose of the parties in 
entering into the contract. See, e.g., E.I. DuPont, 269 F.3d at 196. 
 195. E.I. DuPont, 269 F.3d at 195. 
 196. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 302 cmt. c, illus. 4 (AM. LAW INST. 1981) 
(stating that a “donee beneficiary” is an intended beneficiary under Section 302(1)(b) and 
illustrating the point with a will substitute example: “A, an insurance company, promises B in a 
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an intended will beneficiary brings suit against the testator’s attorney for 
malpractice in the drafting or execution of the will speak to these points. 
Numerous courts have held that an intended will beneficiary whose 
testamentary gift is lost due to the negligence of the testator’s attorney 
may bring a contract claim against the attorney as a third-party 
beneficiary of the contract between the testator and the attorney.197 
The more complicated argument is that a will contestant who 
challenges a will containing an arbitration clause necessarily seeks to 
assert a claim arising from the contract. The argument derives from an 
understanding that the will is but one part of a greater donative freedom 
contract, which also contains a provision providing for the intestate 
passing of a decedent’s property where the decedent failed during his life 
to execute an effective estate plan. This argument also applies to a direct 
benefits estoppel analysis; therefore, this Article develops this argument 
directly below in connection with a discussion of direct benefits estoppel. 
                                                                                                                     
policy of insurance to pay $10,000 on B’s death to C, B’s wife. C is an intended beneficiary under 
Subsection (1)(b)”). 
 197. 3 FARNSWORTH, supra note 94, §§ 10.1, 10.3; Fabian v. Lindsay, 765 S.E.2d 132, 137, 
141 (S.C. 2014) (noting that “[a] majority of jurisdictions now recognize a cause of action by a 
third-party beneficiary of a will or estate planning document against the lawyer whose drafting 
error defeats or diminishes the client’s intent,” and holding that South Carolina law will now 
recognize such causes of action, “both in tort and in contract”); cf. John H. Langbein, The Secret 
Life of the Trust: The Trust as an Instrument of Commerce, 107 YALE. L.J. 165, 185 (1997) (“The 
difference between a trust and a third-party beneficiary contract is largely a lawyers’ 
conceptualism.”). 
The fact that the heir or will beneficiary was unknown or unnamed at the time of contracting 
does not prevent the eventual heir or will beneficiary from being classified as a third-party 
beneficiary of the donative freedom contract. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 308 
(AM. LAW INST. 1981) (“It is not essential to the creation of a right in an intended beneficiary that 
he be identified when a contract containing the promise is made.”); id. § 308 cmt. a, illus. 1 (stating 
that “there is no requirement of identification prior to the time for enforcement of the right” and 
illustrating the point with the example of a will substitute (life insurance contract) beneficiary 
whose future interest was contingent at the time of contracting); see also James Family Charitable 
Found. v. State St. Bank & Tr. Co., 956 N.E.2d 243, 244, 248 (Mass. App. Ct. 2011) (holding that 
a charitable foundation, which was the donee of certain mutual fund shares and which alleged that 
the former custodian of the shares breached its custodianship agreement with the prior owner of 
the shares by delaying transfer of the shares to the charitable foundation, was a third-party 
beneficiary of the custodianship agreement between the donor and the custodian and that “[i]t 
makes no difference that [the] foundation was not identified as an intended beneficiary at the time 
the agreement was entered into”); In re Citgo Petroleum Corp., 248 S.W.3d 769, 773, 776–77 
(Tex. App. 2008) (holding that even though the arbitration contract between an employer and its 
employee did not name the employer’s customer specifically, “the agreement is sufficiently clear 
to establish that the parties intended to cover entities in th[e] category [of the employer’s 
customers]”; therefore, the employer’s customer is a third-party beneficiary of the arbitration 
contract between the employer and the employee and may compel arbitration of the employee’s 
suit against the customer). 
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There are two quite distinct versions of equitable estoppel that courts 
have used to compel arbitration between a signatory to an arbitration 
contract and a non-signatory to the contract: direct benefits estoppel and 
intertwined claims estoppel.198 Only direct benefits estoppel is relevant 
to the instant discussion.199 Under direct benefits estoppel theory, a 
nonparty to a contract “is estopped from repudiating an arbitration clause 
in a contract which he has previously embraced.”200 Thus, the nonparty 
who seeks to enforce a contract may not simultaneously disavow the 
arbitration clause in the contract.201 As the Supreme Court of Texas 
commented in a discussion of direct benefits estoppel theory in the 
arbitration context, “A nonparty cannot both have his contract and defeat 
it too.”202  
For example, the district court in Todd v. Steamship Mutual 
Underwriting Ass’n,203 on remand from the Fifth Circuit, applied direct 
benefits estoppel theory to bind Todd to the arbitration contract entered 
into between Todd’s employer and the employer’s insurance company, 
Steamship.204 Recall that Todd was not a party to the insurance contract 
containing the arbitration clause but sued Steamship to enforce the 
insurance contract to collect on a judgment that his now-insolvent 
employer owed him but failed to pay.205 After finding that Louisiana law 
controlled the question of whether Todd, as a non-signatory to the 
                                                                                                                     
 198. See Bridas S.A.P.I.C. v. Gov’t of Turkm., 345 F.3d 347, 361–62 (5th Cir. 2003); 
Thomson-CSF, S.A. v. Am. Arbitration Ass’n, 64 F.3d 773, 778–79 (2d Cir. 1995); see also 
Alexandra Anne Hui, Note, Equitable Estoppel and the Compulsion of Arbitration, 60 VAND. L. 
REV. 711, 714, 726–39 (2007) (explaining the two different strands of equitable estoppel). 
 199. The version of equitable estoppel referred to as “intertwined claims estoppel” is not 
relevant to the instant discussion. In intertwined claims estoppel, a court estops a signatory to the 
arbitration contract from avoiding arbitration with a non-signatory at the non-signatory’s 
insistence when the signatory has entered into an arbitration contract with a party closely related 
to the non-signatory and “the issues the nonsignatory is seeking to resolve in arbitration are 
intertwined with the agreement that the estopped party has signed.” Thomson-CSF, 64 F.3d at 
779; see also Bridas, 345 F.3d at 360–61 (explaining intertwined claims estoppel). 
 200. Todd v. S.S. Mut. Underwriting Ass’n, No. 08-1195, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 38638, at 
*20 (E.D. La. Mar. 28, 2011); accord Thomson-CSF, 64 F.3d at 779; Bridas, 345 F.3d at 361–62. 
 201. Todd, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 38638, at *21; see also Becker v. Davis, 491 F.3d 1292, 
1300 (11th Cir. 2007) (“[I]f a party relies on the terms of a written agreement in asserting the 
party's claims, that party is equitably estopped from then seeking to avoid an arbitration clause 
within the agreement.”). 
 202. In re Weekley Homes, L.P., 180 S.W.3d 127, 135 (Tex. 2005). The party seeking to 
avoid arbitration in In re Weekley Homes sued in tort rather than under the contract. See id. at 132. 
Nonetheless, the Texas Supreme Court held that the party’s “prior exercise of other contractual 
rights and her equitable entitlement to other contractual benefits prevents her from avoiding the 
arbitration clause” contained in the contract. Id. at 135. 
 203. No. 08-1195, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 38638 (E.D. La. Mar. 28, 2011). 
 204. Id. at *1–3, *20, *32–33.  
 205. Id. at *1–2, *19.  
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insurance contract, could be bound by the contract’s arbitration provision, 
the district court rejected Todd’s argument that he could not be bound by 
the arbitration clause because he had never agreed to arbitrate his dispute 
with the insurance company.206 Rather, in holding that the court could 
compel Todd to arbitrate as a non-signatory, the district court reasoned 
that “[b]ecause Todd is seeking to enforce the terms of the contract 
between Steamship and [his employer], he has embraced that contract 
such that, under both Louisiana and federal case law, he is estopped from 
repudiating the arbitration clause in that contract.”207 
To more fully appreciate how direct benefits estoppel might be 
applied in the context of testator-compelled arbitration, it is useful 
initially to divide into two categories the types of claims that a will 
contestant might bring. The first category consists of claims pursuant to 
which the contestant seeks to increase her inheritance under the will.208 
The second category consists of claims pursuant to which the contestant 
seeks to increase her inheritance under the intestacy scheme.209  
The first category of claims can be further subdivided into two groups: 
suits to construe the will and suits that challenge a testamentary gift to 
someone other than the contestant, which, if successful, would result in 
the gift being redirected under the will to the contestant. In a suit to 
construe the will, the contestant concedes that the will is valid and argues 
for a certain understanding of the meaning of the will that would benefit 
him.210 The suit might concern issues such as the identity of a 
beneficiary,211 identification of the property to which a certain 
beneficiary is entitled,212 or specification of the time for distribution of 
property to the beneficiary.213 Application of the direct benefits estoppel 
theory in the context of a suit to construe the will is straightforward: The 
party seeking to have the will construed in a manner that will favor him 
has embraced the will contract; thus, he is estopped from repudiating the 
contract’s arbitration clause.214 
                                                                                                                     
 206. Id. at *13, *18–19, *22. 
 207. Id. at *22. 
 208. See Horton, supra note 2, at 1074; Murphy, supra note 2, at 629. 
 209. See Horton, supra note 2, at 1075; Murphy, supra note 2, at 629. 
 210. Love & Sterk, supra note 3, at 555–56. 
 211. See, e.g., In re Estate of Barbey, 32 N.Y.S.2d 191, 193 (Sur. Ct. 1941) (holding that a 
testator may authorize an executor to determine which employees qualify to receive certain 
property under the will). 
 212. See, e.g., Couts v. Holland, 107 S.W. 913, 914–15 (Tex. Civ. App. 1908) (“The power 
[that the testator gave to executors] to determine what the will means, in its every part and 
provision, involves, as well, the power to decide what property it operates upon . . . .”). 
 213. Love & Sterk, supra note 3, at 555–56. 
 214. Cf. Love & Sterk, supra note 3, at 557 (“Because all of the parties to any potential 
construction proceeding concede the validity of the will, a testator who includes a mediation 
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Alternatively, the will contestant who seeks to increase her inheritance 
under the will might argue that a testamentary gift to someone other than 
the contestant should fail and, consequently, be redirected under the will 
to the contestant.215 Consider, for example, a sole residuary legatee who 
challenges a provision of the will that bequeaths $100,000 to A. The 
residuary legatee is entitled to the portion of the probate estate that is left 
over after each non-residuary beneficiary has received her gift. Thus, the 
residuary legatee’s successful challenge to A’s $100,000 bequest would 
increase the residuary legatee’s inheritance by $100,000. The residuary 
legatee might allege that A used fraud, duress, or undue influence to 
procure the challenged bequest or that the gift was the product of the 
testator’s insane delusion. Such allegations, if proven, would invalidate 
only A’s $100,000 bequest but not the remainder of the will.216 Where the 
will contestant’s challenge pertains only to a portion of the will and the 
contestant seeks to take more under the will than she would take absent 
the will contest, direct benefits estoppel should bind the contestant to the 
arbitration clause. The contestant seeks to enforce the portion of the will 
contract that she does not challenge; accordingly, she may not 
simultaneously disavow the will contract’s arbitration clause.217 
The second category of claims that a will contestant might bring, 
consisting of challenges pursuant to which the contestant seeks to 
increase his inheritance under the intestacy statutes, can also be further 
subdivided into two groups.218 The first type of challenge within this 
category alleges that the testator failed to comply with the relevant 
jurisdiction’s formalities for the execution of a will, and thus the will is 
                                                                                                                     
provision in the will can legally bind the parties to any will construction dispute.” (footnote 
omitted)); Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith v. Eddings, 838 S.W.2d 874, 876, 879 (Tex. 
App. 1992) (“[T]he settlor and beneficiaries of a trust [who did not sign the arbitration agreement 
at issue] are bound by a clause in an account agreement [signed by the trustee] to arbitrate the 
claims arising out of transactions in the trust’s account.”). 
Notwithstanding the straightforward application of direct benefits estoppel to such a situation, 
it might be prudent for the testator to state expressly that a beneficiary’s choice to take under the 
will shall constitute acceptance of the will’s arbitration provision. Cf. Strong, Empowering 
Settlors, supra note 12, at 311–12 (recommending this approach with respect to an arbitration 
agreement contained in a trust). 
 215. One variation of this scenario would present the contestant who challenges a codicil to 
a will but not the will aside from the codicil, where the will itself contains the arbitration clause. 
 216. See, e.g., RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROP.: WILLS AND OTHER DONATIVE TRANSFERS 
§ 8.3(a) (AM. LAW INST. 2003) (“A donative transfer is invalid to the extent that it was procured 
by undue influence, duress or fraud.”); id. § 8.1 cmt. s (“A particular donative transfer is 
invalid . . . to the extent that it was the product of an insane delusion.”). 
 217. Cf. Strong, Arbitration of Trust Disputes, supra note 4, at 1219 (“If a party bases its 
claim on any portion of the trust, then the arbitration clause will remain in effect, since it is 
impossible to make a claim under the trust while simultaneously denying its validity.”). 
 218. See Love & Sterk, supra note 3, at 560. 
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of no effect.219 The second type of challenge alleges that an event or 
condition at the time of the will’s execution affected the testator’s 
testamentary intent—either the intent to make a will or the intent to 
execute a particular dispositive scheme—and therefore some or all of the 
property that the will purports to gift should pass by intestacy.220 This 
second type of challenge might allege, for example, that the testator 
lacked the mental capacity needed to execute a will.221 Where the testator 
lacked sufficient mental capacity to execute a will, the entire will is 
necessarily invalid.222 This second type of challenge also might be based 
on allegations of fraud, duress, undue influence, or an insane delusion.223 
A testamentary gift is invalid to the extent that it was the product of fraud, 
duress, undue influence, or an insane delusion.224 Thus, each of these 
conditions might result in the total invalidity of the will or merely in the 
invalidity of a particular gift under the will that might then pass by 
intestacy if the gift is not otherwise redirected under the will. For 
example, if an heir were to argue successfully that a will’s residuary 
clause was the product of fraud, duress, undue influence, or an insane 
delusion, the residuary property would then pass by intestacy. 
The heir who challenges a will in the hope of increasing her intestate 
inheritance does not raise a claim arising under the will. One might 
reason, therefore, that such an heir should not be bound by the will’s 
arbitration clause.225 In the language of third-party beneficiary theory, the 
testator did not intend that the heir benefit from the will contract that 
contains the arbitration clause, and performance of the will contract 
would not complete a gift intended for the heir. One might conclude, then, 
that the heir should not be bound by the will’s arbitration clause under 
third-party beneficiary theory. In the language of direct benefits estoppel 
theory, the heir has not “embraced” the will contract.226 Thus, there is an 
argument that the heir should not be estopped from repudiating the will 
                                                                                                                     
 219. Id. 
 220. See id.  
 221. Id.  
 222. ATKINSON, supra note 29, at 241. 
 223. Love & Sterk, supra note 3, at 560–61.  
 223. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROP.: WILLS AND OTHER DONATIVE TRANSFERS § 8.3(a) 
(AM. LAW INST. 2003) (“A donative transfer is invalid to the extent that it was procured by undue 
influence, duress or fraud.”); id. § 8.1 cmt. s (“A particular donative transfer is invalid . . . to the 
extent that it was the product of an insane delusion.”). 
 225. See Clark v. Clark, 57 P.3d 95, 98–99 (Okla. Civ. App. 2002) (holding that the 
beneficiary of a trust was not bound by an arbitration agreement contained in a contract between 
the trustee of the trust and a financial institution where the beneficiary’s claim against the financial 
institution did not arise from the contract). 
 226. See Todd v. S.S. Mut. Underwriting Ass’n, No. 08-1195, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 38638, 
at *20 (E.D. La. Mar. 28, 2011).  
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contract’s arbitration clause. 
The heir who challenges a will in the hope of increasing his intestate 
inheritance does, however, raise a claim arising under a separate 
provision of the greater donative freedom contract between the donor and 
the state. This greater contract includes not only provisions governing the 
passing of property by will, but also provisions governing the passing of 
property by intestacy and by will substitutes, such as the revocable inter 
vivos trust. As the heir seeks to take under the greater donative freedom 
contract, he should be bound by any applicable arbitration clause in the 
contract.227 Thus, under this Article’s theory, the heir should be bound by 
a will’s arbitration provision even when the heir’s will contest seeks to 
render the will a complete nullity. 
The key to understanding this argument is to appreciate that the 
intestacy scheme itself is an implied unilateral contract between the donor 
and the state. The implied unilateral intestacy contract looks a great deal 
like the implied unilateral will contract. As a means to secure a more 
productive citizenry, the state offers in its probate code to distribute a 
future decedent’s property in accordance with the property owner’s 
implied wishes.228 The property owner accepts and provides 
consideration for the intestacy contract by performance, specifically by 
being economically productive and by saving and investing her estate 
rather than consuming it. Under the broad reasoning of Woolley and its 
progeny, the intestacy contract is formed even if neither the property 
owner specifically nor the citizenry generally is conversant with the 
intricacies of the state’s intestacy statutes.229 Rather, the critical factor is 
that the state has created a situation that is “instinct with an obligation”230 
in conveying to the citizenry the general sense that the state will promote 
the implied wishes of each property owner by allowing the property 
owner’s closest relations to succeed to her intestate estate at her death. 
This understanding of the nature of the implied unilateral intestacy 
contract between the donor and the state leads to the conclusion that the 
heir who seeks to increase his intestate inheritance by challenging a will 
should be bound by the will’s arbitration clause under third-party 
beneficiary theory. The state enacts its intestacy statutes with the intent 
that the statutes will benefit the heir whose very status as heir is a creature 
of the statutes. Moreover, performance of the intestacy statutes would 
                                                                                                                     
 227. Cf. Elder v. Elder, 120 A.2d 815, 819 (R.I. 1956) (discussing the validity of a no-contest 
clause and commenting that “[i]t is also a familiar principle of equity that one may not claim a 
gift from the bounty of a testator to which he had no original right, while at the same time attacking 
the validity of the instrument which makes the gift. He must take the devise or bequest together 
with its burden as well as its benefits.”).  
 228. See Sitkoff, supra note 22, at 645.  
 229. See supra notes 108–30 and accompanying text (discussing Woolley and its progeny). 
 230. Toussaint v. Blue Cross & Blue Shield of Mich., 292 N.W.2d 880, 892 (Mich. 1980) 
(quoting Wood v. Lucy, Lady Duff-Gordon, 118 N.E. 214, 214 (N.Y. 1917)).  
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complete a gift intended for the heir. Thus, the heir is a third-party 
beneficiary of the intestacy provisions of the greater donative freedom 
contract. As the heir seeks to assert rights arising from the greater 
donative freedom contract, he should be bound by the arbitration clause 
contained in the will contract provisions of the greater donative freedom 
contract. 
The same understanding of the nature of the implied unilateral 
intestacy contract between the donor and the state also leads to the 
conclusion that the heir who seeks to increase her intestate inheritance by 
challenging a will should be bound by the will’s arbitration clause under 
direct benefits estoppel theory. The heir’s will contest challenges only a 
portion of the greater donative freedom contract. Indeed, the heir seeks to 
enforce the portion of the greater donative freedom contract that she does 
not challenge. Accordingly, having embraced the greater donative 
freedom contract, even if only in part, she may not simultaneously 
disavow the greater donative freedom contract’s arbitration clause.231 
Thus, this Article’s implied unilateral contract theory enables 
enforcement of a will’s arbitration clause in circumstances where the 
clause would not be enforceable under the various theories discussed in 
Part I that seek to bind the donee to a will’s arbitration provision in the 
absence of any contract. Such theories are nonstarters if the court holds 
that the governing arbitration statute makes enforceable only arbitration 
provisions contained in a contract. Moreover, such theories would not 
allow for testator-compelled arbitration where the will contestant seeks 
by his contest to increase his intestate inheritance.232 Given the 
prevalence of such claims in the universe of will contests, such theories 
are of limited utility. 
This Article’s implied unilateral contract theory, however, will not 
mandate arbitration of all challenges to a will that contains a testator-
compelled arbitration provision. To conclude that a will contestant should 
be bound by a will’s arbitration clause, whether under third-party 
beneficiary theory, direct benefits estoppel theory, or both, is not 
necessarily to conclude that the will contestant must arbitrate her will 
contest. Rather, under separability theory, a court rather than an arbitrator 
should decide the will contestant’s claim where the contest specifically 
or necessarily challenges the will’s arbitration provision.233  
                                                                                                                     
 231. It is of no moment that some of the terms of the intestacy contract are not written. What 
matters under the FAA and state arbitration law is that the arbitration clause itself is “[a] written 
provision in . . . a contract . . . to settle by arbitration a controversy thereafter arising out of such 
contract.” See 9 U.S.C. § 2 (2012). 
 232. See supra notes 46–73 and accompanying text. 
 233. The parties to an arbitration contract may agree to a delegation clause that will alter the 
separability scheme so that an arbitrator will have the authority to decide even a challenge to the 
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IV.  SEPARABILITY AND THE ARBITRATION OF WILL CONTESTS 
Scholars and practitioners who know a great deal about the law of 
donative transfers but little or nothing about the law of arbitration might 
have difficulty comprehending the notion that an arbitrator who derives 
his authority from a will or trust might have the power to adjudicate a 
challenge to the validity of that will or trust.234 After all, if the arbitrator 
determines that the donative instrument is not valid, is it not necessarily 
the case that the arbitrator (who derives his authority from the donative 
instrument) never had any authority to adjudicate the dispute? Such an 
understanding among donative transfers experts that an arbitrator may not 
adjudicate the validity of an instrument from which he derives his 
authority to serve as arbitrator may account, in part, for the limited nature 
of recently proposed and enacted statutory reforms validating arbitration 
clauses found in wills and trusts—ACTEC’s Model Enforceability Act as 
well as the Arizona, Florida, Missouri, and New Hampshire statutes 
discussed above exclude challenges to the validity of the donative 
instrument.235 
The arbitration doctrine of separability, however, suggests that an 
arbitrator may well have the authority to adjudicate a challenge to the 
validity of a will or trust from which her authority to serve as arbitrator 
arises.236 In short, the doctrine of separability provides that an arbitration 
clause found within a contract is itself a contract separate and apart from 
the container contract within which it is found.237 Thus, under the 
separability doctrine, a challenge to the validity of the container contract 
is not a challenge to the arbitration clause found within the container 
                                                                                                                     
arbitration agreement. Rent-A-Center, W., Inc. v. Jackson, 561 U.S. 63, 68 (2010) (“[T]he 
delegation provision is an agreement to arbitrate threshold issues concerning the arbitration 
agreement.”). In such a case, the court will have the authority to decide only a challenge specific 
to the delegation clause. Id. at 68–72; see also AM. ARBITRATION ASS’N, WILLS AND TRUSTS 
ARBITRATION RULES & MEDIATION PROCEDURES R. 7(a) (2012), https://www.adr.org/aaa/Show 
Property?nodeId=/UCM/ADRSTG_024438 (“The arbitrator shall have the power to rule on his 
or her own jurisdiction, including any objections with respect to the existence, scope or validity 
of the arbitration agreement.”). For a more extensive discussion of delegation clauses in the 
context of will or trust dispute arbitration, see Spitko, Arbitration of Internal Trust Disputes, supra 
note 8. 
 234. Cf. S.I. Strong, Mandatory Arbitration of Internal Trust Disputes: Improving 
Arbitrability and Enforceability Through Proper Procedural Choices, 28 ARB. INT’L 591, 594 
(2012) (offering as an explanation for why the arbitral community has not successfully worked to 
provide a set of specialized arbitral rules for arbitration of internal trust disputes, “that the 
traditional isolation of trust law has meant that few specialists in arbitration were experienced 
enough in trust law to undertake this kind of analysis”). 
 235. See supra notes 75–93 and accompanying text. 
 236. See Spitko, Protecting the Abhorrent Testator, supra note 6, at 303–07. 
 237. See Buckeye Check Cashing, Inc. v. Cardegna, 546 U.S. 440, 445 (2006). 
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contract.238 
In 1967, in the landmark case of Prima Paint Corp. v. Flood & 
Conklin Manufacturing Co.,239 the U.S. Supreme Court held that the FAA 
provides for such a separability scheme in cases to which the FAA 
applies.240 In Prima Paint, the Court focused its analysis on Section 4 of 
the FAA, which provides that a court hearing a motion to compel 
arbitration “upon being satisfied that the making of the agreement for 
arbitration or the failure to comply therewith is not in issue . . . shall make 
an order directing the parties to proceed to arbitration in accordance with 
the terms of the agreement.”241 Section 4 further provides that when “the 
making of the arbitration agreement or the failure, neglect, or refusal to 
perform the same be in issue, the court shall proceed summarily to the 
trial thereof.”242 The Court interpreted this language to mean that if a 
party directs a claim of invalidity specifically at the arbitration provision 
of the contract, then a court may adjudicate the claim.243 The Court went 
on to conclude, however, that “the plain meaning of the statute” required 
that in a case such as the one before it, in which a party alleged fraud in 
the inducement of the entire contract, an arbitrator rather than a court 
should resolve the claim.244 Nearly forty years later, in Buckeye Check 
Cashing, Inc. v. Cardegna,245 the Court made clear that Prima Paint’s 
rule of separability applies not only in a case in which a party alleges that 
the container contract is voidable but also in a case in which a party 
alleges that the container contract is void ab initio, such as where a party 
alleges the illegality of the container contract.246 
Thus, under the doctrine of separability, a court rather than an 
arbitrator should decide a challenge that goes specifically to the will’s 
arbitration clause. Conversely, an arbitrator rather than a court should 
decide any claim that challenges a specific provision of the will other than 
the arbitration clause. Such a claim undeniably does not put the making 
of the arbitration clause in issue. 
In the context of a will contest that seeks to invalidate the will as a 
whole, application of the separability doctrine should require that an 
arbitrator decides the will contest unless the contest necessarily 
                                                                                                                     
 238. Id. at 445–46. 
 239. 388 U.S. 395 (1967). 
 240. Id. at 402–04. The RUAA expressly adopts the separability scheme. See UNIF. 
ARBITRATION ACT § 6(c) (UNIF. LAW COMM’N 2000) (“An arbitrator shall decide whether a 
condition precedent to arbitrability has been fulfilled and whether a contract containing a valid 
agreement to arbitrate is enforceable.”). 
 241. Prima Paint, 388 U.S. at 403 n.11 (quoting 9 U.S.C. § 4 (2012)). 
 242. 9 U.S.C. § 4. 
 243. Prima Paint, 388 U.S. at 403–04. 
 244. Id. at 404. 
 245. 546 U.S. 440 (2006). 
 246. See id. at 446–49. 
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implicates the arbitration provision. Consider first a challenge to a will 
asserting that the entire will is invalid because the testator failed to 
comply with the formalities statutorily required for the execution of a 
will—specifically, that two witnesses did not sign the will. An arbitration 
contract need not be witnessed. Thus, the will contest does not implicate 
the arbitration clause even if the will containing the clause is alleged to 
be entirely invalid. An arbitrator, therefore, should decide the execution 
challenge. 
Consider another challenge alleging that a testator’s entire dispositive 
scheme is the product of fraud in the inducement, duress, undue 
influence, or an insane delusion. If any such allegation is proven to be 
true, the testator’s will in its entirety should be invalid.247 Nonetheless, 
the allegation does not implicate the will’s arbitration provision as there 
is no allegation that the arbitration provision specifically is the product of 
fraud in the inducement, duress, undue influence, or an insane delusion. 
Conceptually, it makes sense to argue that fraud in the inducement, 
duress, undue influence, or an insane delusion affected the dispositive 
scheme but did not affect the arbitration provision. Thus, an arbitrator 
should decide the fraud, duress, undue influence, or insane delusion 
challenge. 
A mental capacity challenge to a will containing an arbitration clause 
presents a more difficult separability puzzle.248 As noted above, a 
testator’s lack of mental capacity necessarily invalidates her entire will 
executed while the testator lacked mental capacity.249 Thus, a will 
contestant’s mental capacity challenge necessarily goes to the entire will. 
One might conclude, therefore, that a straightforward application of 
Prima Paint requires that an arbitrator decide the mental capacity 
challenge to a will where the will contains an arbitration clause.250 
                                                                                                                     
 247. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROP.: WILLS AND OTHER DONATIVE TRANSFERS §§ 8.1 cmt. 
s, 8.3(a) (AM. LAW INST. 2003). 
 248. The Supreme Court has noted that its separability cases have dealt with the issue of 
whether a contract is valid but not with the issue of “whether any agreement . . . was ever 
concluded.” Buckeye, 546 U.S. at 444 n.1. In Buckeye, the Court included “whether the signor 
lacked the mental capacity to assent” as an example of an issue related to the conclusion of a 
contract. Id. Professor Stephen Ware has argued that the Court’s broader FAA jurisprudence 
“should be read to converge into a coherent whole consisting of the rule that the separability 
doctrine does not apply to the question whether a particular party formed a contract containing an 
arbitration clause but does apply to questions about defenses to the enforcement of that contract.” 
Stephen J. Ware, Arbitration Law’s Separability Doctrine After Buckeye Check Cashing, Inc. v. 
Cardegna, 8 NEV. L.J. 107, 115 (2007). However, Professor Ware has argued further that 
incapacity is a defense to contract enforcement and thus would fall within the list of questions to 
which the separability doctrine would apply under such an approach. See id. at 115–16, 118–19. 
 249. See supra note 222 and accompanying text. 
 250. A Pennsylvania superior court has held on public policy grounds that an arbitrator may 
not decide issues of mental capacity. In re Trust of Harold, 604 A.2d 263, 265–67 (Pa. Sup. Ct. 
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Indeed, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit in Primerica 
Life Insurance Co. v. Brown251 applied Prima Paint to require arbitration 
of a breach of contract claim where the contract at issue contained an 
arbitration clause252 even though the district court had found that the party 
seeking to avoid arbitration “ha[d] been profoundly retarded since birth” 
and lacked the mental capacity to enter into a contract under the relevant 
state law.253 In holding that the merits of the underlying dispute were for 
the arbitrator rather than for the district court to decide, the Fifth Circuit 
first noted that “Brown’s capacity defense is a defense to his entire 
agreement with CitiFinancial and not a specific challenge to the 
arbitration clause.”254 The court went on to reason that “[t]herefore, 
Brown’s capacity defense is part of the underlying dispute between the 
parties which, in light of Prima Paint and its progeny, must be submitted 
to the arbitrator.”255 
With respect to separability, however, a mental capacity defense to 
contract enforcement can be distinguished meaningfully from the fraud 
and illegality defenses to contract enforcement presented respectively in 
Prima Paint and Buckeye.256 In sum, unlike with respect to a fraud in the 
inducement defense or an illegality defense, separability with respect to 
a mental capacity defense is conceptually nonsensical.257 Fraud that 
induces a container contract is most unlikely to relate in any specific way 
to the contract’s arbitration clause. Thus, in Prima Paint, the party 
seeking to avoid arbitration of its fraud claim pled fraud in the 
inducement relating to the contract as a whole but, on the facts alleged, 
could not have pled fraud relating to the contract’s arbitration 
                                                                                                                     
1992). The court expressed its concern with “unwanted ramifications” of an arbitrator’s finding 
of incompetency such as uncertainty as to whether the arbitrator might appoint a guardian for the 
donor and, if so, whether the guardian might commit the donor to a hospital or otherwise prescribe 
medical treatment for the donor. Id. at 267. These concerns are irrelevant when the donor is 
deceased as in the case of testator-compelled arbitration. 
 251. 304 F.3d 469 (5th Cir. 2002). 
 252. Id. at 470–71. 
 253. Id. at 471; id. at 472 (Dennis, J., concurring). 
 254. Id. at 472 (majority opinion) (emphasis added). 
 255. Id. 
 256. Cf. Love & Sterk, supra note 3, at 561 (arguing that courts are unlikely to apply the 
separability doctrine in the context of a will contest “because contestants are typically arguing 
that the testator had no capacity to execute the will or that the will reflects the wishes of someone 
other than the testator; and, unlike the situation of an arbitration clause embedded in an otherwise 
unenforceable contract, the disputing parties themselves never agreed to the use of the process”). 
 257. Autumn Smith, You Can’t Judge Me: Mental Capacity Challenges to Arbitration 
Provisions, 56 BAYLOR L. REV. 1051, 1076 (2004) (“In most situations, a mental capacity 
challenge cannot logically be directed at a specific portion of a contract, where conduct-based 
defenses clearly can.”). 
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provision.258 Moreover, it is difficult to imagine how illegality infecting 
a purported container contract might relate specifically to the contract’s 
arbitration provision. Therefore, the parties in Buckeye seeking to avoid 
arbitration of their illegality claim pled the illegality of the purported 
container contract but, on the facts alleged, could not have pled the 
illegality of the contract’s arbitration provision.259 
In contrast, the alleged facts that give rise to a mental capacity 
challenge to a contract necessarily will also give rise to a mental capacity 
challenge to the contract’s arbitration provision.260 Thus, any party who 
can plead facts alleging that she lacked the mental capacity to enter into 
a contract can also plead facts alleging that she specifically lacked the 
mental capacity to enter into the contract’s arbitration clause. The latter 
pleading should suffice to put “the making of the arbitration 
agreement . . . in issue” in the words of Section 4 of the FAA.261 The 
reality that the very same facts will support both a conclusion that a party 
lacked the mental capacity to enter into a contract, and also a conclusion 
that the party specifically lacked the mental capacity to enter into the 
arbitration clause suggests that Primerica’s reasoning grounding its 
application of Prima Paint is simplistic. The Primerica court failed to 
address adequately the argument that a mental capacity defense is both a 
defense to the entire contract and a specific challenge to the contract’s 
arbitration clause.262 
The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit has recognized this 
fundamental distinction between a mental capacity defense and a contract 
                                                                                                                     
 258. See Prima Paint Corp. v. Flood & Conklin Mfg. Co., 388 U.S. 395, 397–98 (1967) 
(discussing the facts giving rise to Prima Paint’s claim that Flood & Conklin fraudulently induced 
their container contract by representing “that it was solvent and able to perform its contractual 
obligations, whereas it was in fact insolvent and intended to file a [bankruptcy] petition”). 
 259. See Buckeye Check Cashing, Inc. v. Cardegna, 546 U.S. 440, 442–43 (2006) 
(discussing the facts giving rise to the allegation that “Buckeye charged usurious interest rates 
and that the [container contract at issue] violated various Florida lending and consumer-protection 
laws, rendering it criminal on its face”). 
 260. Alan Scott Rau, “Separability” in the United States Supreme Court, 2006 STOCKHOLM 
INT’L ARB. REV. 1, 15–17 (arguing that Prima Paint “does not merely preserve for the courts 
challenges that are ‘restricted’ or ‘limited’ to ‘just’ the arbitration clause alone” but rather 
“preserves for the courts any claim at all that necessarily calls an agreement to arbitrate into 
question” and citing a mental capacity challenge as such a claim); Smith, supra note 256, at 1073 
(“A litigant would be unable to make an independent challenge to an arbitration agreement based 
on his or her mental capacity, as a litigant’s mental capacity to sign a contract and mental capacity 
to enter into an arbitration agreement contained in that contract will be identical in most cases.”). 
 261. 9 U.S.C. § 4 (2012). 
 262. See Rau, supra note 260, at 14–15 & n.40 (describing Primerica as “[a]n astonishing 
decision” and arguing that “it should be obvious that a challenge can be ‘to the arbitration clause 
itself’ without being ‘specifically to [its] arbitration provision[s]’” (quoting Buckeye, 546 U.S. at 
445–46)).  
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defense such as fraud in the inducement with respect to a separability 
analysis. In Spahr v. Secco,263 the Tenth Circuit specifically rejected the 
Fifth Circuit’s reasoning in Primerica and held that Prima Paint’s 
separability rule does not apply where a party has asserted a mental 
capacity defense to a contract’s enforcement.264 In concluding that “the 
analytical formula developed in Prima Paint cannot be applied with 
precision when a party contends that an entire contract containing an 
arbitration provision is unenforceable because he or she lacked the mental 
capacity to enter into the contract,” the court found it critical that 
“[u]nlike a claim of fraud in the inducement, which can be directed at 
individual provisions in a contract, a mental capacity challenge can 
logically be directed only at the entire contract.”265 Thus, the court held 
that a “mental incapacity defense naturally goes to both the entire contract 
and the specific agreement to arbitrate in the contract” and necessarily 
places the agreement to arbitrate in issue.266 
The blanket rule in Spahr should be qualified for present purposes to 
take account of temporal issues that may arise in will contests. Assume, 
for example, that the relevant arbitration provision appears in a codicil 
executed subsequent to the execution of the contested will. In theory, a 
testator might lack sufficient mental capacity at one moment yet possess 
sufficient capacity the next.267 An allegation that the testator lacked the 
mental capacity necessary to execute the will, therefore, would not be a 
mental capacity challenge specific to the arbitration clause contained in 
the codicil. Assume in the alternative, for example, that the arbitration 
clause is contained in a will executed prior to a contested codicil. 
Similarly, an allegation that the testator lacked the mental capacity 
needed to execute the codicil would not be a mental capacity challenge 
specific to the arbitration clause contained in the will. 
In sum, when a will contestant specifically challenges the validity of 
an arbitration clause found in the will, a court should decide the challenge 
to the arbitration clause. A court also should decide a challenge to the will 
that necessarily also challenges the validity of the arbitration clause found 
in the will. Otherwise, the arbitrator, whose authority to adjudicate arises 
from the will, should decide the will contest. 
CONCLUSION 
A consensus is developing in the case law, the academic commentary, 
                                                                                                                     
 263. 330 F.3d 1266 (10th Cir. 2003). 
 264. Id. at 1272. 
 265. Id. at 1273. 
 266. Id. 
 267. ATKINSON, supra note 29, at 241. 
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and the statutory reform movement that a testator’s provision in her will 
mandating arbitration of any challenge to the will should not be 
enforceable against a beneficiary who has not agreed to the arbitration 
provision, at least where the contestant, by his contest, seeks to increase 
his inheritance outside the will.268 Grounding this consensus is the 
understanding that a will is not a contract. This understanding has 
influenced not only the case law but also the scholarship and legal reform 
efforts focusing on the issue.269 
This Article argues that a will is a contract, albeit not one between the 
testator and her beneficiary. A will is part of an implied unilateral contract 
between the testator and the state in which the state offers to honor the 
testator’s donative intent and the testator accepts and provides 
consideration for the offer by creating and preserving wealth. 
Importantly, the greater donative freedom contract of which the will is a 
part also provides for the distribution of an individual’s intestate property 
in line with the individual’s imputed intent should the individual fail to 
execute an effective estate plan. Similar to the testator, the property 
owner who has failed to make an effective estate plan accepts this offer 
of intestate distribution through her industry and thrift. This Article’s 
theory borrows from the law respecting implied unilateral contracts 
arising from employee handbooks in concluding that it should be of no 
moment that the property owner is unfamiliar with the specifics of a state 
probate code. Rather, the critical factor should be that the state has, 
through its offer to respect donative intent, created an atmosphere that is 
“instinct with an obligation” and that encourages diligence and the 
prudent management of wealth. 
The conclusion that a will is a contract grounds this Article’s 
additional argument that the FAA and state arbitration statutes require 
enforcement of testator-compelled arbitration provisions contained in a 
will. Settled arbitration law in conjunction with third-party beneficiary 
theory or direct benefits estoppel theory supports binding the beneficiary 
to the will’s arbitration contract. Neither the fact that the beneficiary has 
not signed the will nor the fact that the testator’s acceptance of the 
donative freedom contract is implied defeats this argument.  
That a will is a contract also supports a normative argument that the 
law should enforce testator-compelled arbitration provisions contained in 
a will. It is only fair that one who claims a right arising under a contract 
be subject to the arbitration provision relating to claims arising under that 
contract. This normative argument is bolstered by conditional gift theory, 
which provides a cardinal principle in the law of donative transfers—the 
                                                                                                                     
 268. See supra Part I.  
 269. See supra Part I. 
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rights of the donee are derivative of and subordinate to the rights of the 
donor.270 
Finally, an arbitrator whose authority to arbitrate arises from a will 
should have the power to adjudicate a challenge to the validity of that will 
unless the challenge speaks specifically to the validity of the arbitration 
provision. Pursuant to the arbitration doctrine of separability, the 
arbitration provision within a will should be understood to be a contract 
separate and apart from the will. A challenge to the validity of the will 
contract as a whole may also focus specifically on the validity of the 
arbitration contract. Where the will contest does not focus specifically on 
the validity of the will’s arbitration provision, the arbitrator’s authority 
has gone unchallenged. 
Despite the merits of enforcing testator-compelled arbitration 
provisions contained in a will, the enforceability of such provisions 
remains an unresolved issue in most jurisdictions.271 This uncertainty 
imperils the arbitration virtues of speed, economy, and finality, and it 
threatens to add a layer of cost and delay to the contest of a will. Thus, 
this uncertainty likely discourages testators from including arbitration 
provisions in their wills. Therefore, legislation authorizing testator-
compelled arbitration, including in cases where the contestant seeks to 
increase his inheritance outside of the will, would bring much needed 
certainty to the law in this area. 
  
                                                                                                                     
 270. See supra note 160 and accompanying text.  
 271. See supra notes 12–13 and accompanying text. 
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